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# West Europe Report

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21 JULY 1986

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

## CONTENTS

## POLITICAL

## DENMARK

Prediction of Conservative Political Trend Disputed (Hans Jorgen Poulsen; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 11 Jun 86) .....	1
Long-Range Social Changes Seen Threat to Political Stability (Per Thygesen Poulsen; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 10 Jun 86) ....	3
Poll of Social Democrats Shows Majority Prefer SF Tie (BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 12 Jun 86) .....	5

## FINLAND

Briefs	
Beirut Personnel to Damascus .....	6

## GREECE

Details on Provisions of Bill on KYP Restructuring (ETHNOS, 23 May 86; TA NEA, 30 May 86) .....	7
Bill Provisions .....	7
KYP Leadership, by Str. Kalogeropoulos .....	8
Provision on Parties, Trade Unions .....	10

## PORTUGAL

MDP/CDE Views Other Political Alliances (DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 15 May 86) .....	11
--	----

Jardim Seen Holding Real Power Within PSD (Jose Antonio Saraiva; EXPRESSO, 31 May 86) .....	13
Political Equation Changes, Becomes Clearer (Jose Antonio Saraiva; EXPRESSO, 10, 17 May 86) .....	15
Parties Divided Into Center, Extremes New Political Advantages	15 17
PCP Reportedly Ready To Adapt to New Realities (EXPRESSO, 31 May 86) .....	18
Power Seen Divided Into Three Separate Poles (Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa; SEMANARIO, 17 May 86) .....	19
Poll Indicates Politicians' Popularity (EXPRESSO, 17 May 86) .....	22
Briefs	
Tighter Border Control	26
Libyan Raid Condemned	26
Positive Current Account Balance	26

#### SWEDEN

Labor Union Chief Malm Explains Differences With SDF Policies (Anders Jonsson; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 29 May 86) .....	27
Conservative Paper Doubts Carlsson's Strong Position To Last (Editorial; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 26 May 86) .....	30
Liberals, Communists Biggest Losers as SDF Posts Poll Record (DAGENS NYHETER, 18 May 86) .....	33
Sympathy Wave for Carlsson, by Dick Ljungberg	33
Voters Like Carlsson Style, by Sven Svensson	35
SDF Captures New Groups, Editorial	39

#### MILITARY

#### EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Symposium Discusses Soviet Security Goals in Nordic Area (Lars Erik Haggman; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 25 May 86) .....	40
---	----

#### DENMARK

Paper Charges SDF Moving Away From Defense Agreement (Editorial; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 10 Jun 86) .....	47
--	----



Civil Defense Agency Drafting Plan With Gas Masks for All  
(Jesper P. Jespersen; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 12 Jun 86) ..... 49

Two Shipbuilders in Competition for Fisheries Patrol Ships  
(Nils Eric Boesgaard; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 12 Jun 86) ..... 51

#### FINLAND

Increased Concern for Civil Defense Following Chernobyl  
(Various sources, 31 May, 14 Jun 86) ..... 53

Downtown Helsinki Lacks Shelters ..... 53

Communist Paper Discusses Capability, by Jukka Parkkari ..... 54

Helsinki Improving Alarm System ..... 60

#### GREECE

Steyr Firm Perilously Close to Closing  
(ETHNOS, 24 May 86; AKROPOLIS, 27 May 86) ..... 61

Workers Protest, by Dimitri Kalantzi ..... 61

Chairman, Director Resign ..... 62

#### PORTUGAL

Budgetary, Internal Issues Affect Armed Forces  
(EXPRESSO, 10 May 86) ..... 63

A-7 Corsair Aircraft Efficiency Doubt Following Accident  
(O JORNAL, 29 May-5 Jun 86) ..... 65

#### SWEDEN

Hans von Hofsten: Country's Military Credibility Questioned  
(Hans von Hofsten; DAGENS NYHETER, 8 Jun 86) ..... 67

Entire Harsfjarden To Be Blocked With Nets To Halt Subs  
(Lars Porne; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 30 May 86) ..... 72

Private Group Donates Million Kronor for Antisub Measures  
(DAGENS NYHETER, 6 May 86) ..... 75

### ECONOMIC

#### DENMARK/GREENLAND

Canadian, Swedish Firms in Agreement To Save Zinc Mine  
(Jesper Elle; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 9 Jun 86) ..... 76

## **PORTUGAL**

<b>Foreign Loans Successfully Renegotiated</b> <b>(EXPRESSO, 17 May 86) .....</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>'Absolute Poverty' Shown To Be High</b> <b>(DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 15 May 86) .....</b>	<b>78</b>

## **ENERGY**

### **DENMARK/GREENLAND**

<b>Oil Reserves Found To Be Less Than Expected</b> <b>(Jesper Elle; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 9 Jun 86) .....</b>	<b>80</b>
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POLITICAL

DENMARK

PREDICTION OF CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL TREND DISPUTED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Jun 86 p 12

[Article by Hans Jørgen Poulsen]

[Text] Not all social researchers and observers are in agreement with the prediction that Denmark will move toward the right within the next decade. The party system, at any rate, is not moving toward polarization. It seems as if the country, if anything, will gather around the four old parties and the Socialist People's Party.

No decisive shift toward the right is taking place in Denmark. This opinion will appear from an article to be published in the next issue of the scientific periodical SCANDINAVIAN POLITICAL STUDIES. This thus refutes the picture of Denmark in 10 years described in the newsletter of the Institute for Future Research, referred to in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE yesterday. It predicts a development with increasing conflicts and deeper gaps between the social groups. Differences both in incomes and modes of life between employees within the private and public sectors may become the factors which will release confrontations.

Assistant Professor Jørgen Goul Andersen, graduate in political science, of the Institute of Political Science at Århus University, presents a somewhat different view in his survey in SCANDINAVIAN POLITICAL STUDIES. On the basis of thorough analyses of voter positions, he has previously shown that young people of today are no more attracted to the nonsocialist parties than their predecessors. The parliamentary election in 1979 was the hitherto most left-wing oriented election, but even compared with that election, no election since then has shown any major shift toward the right within the younger age brackets of voters.

Unlike the Institute for Future Research, Jørgen Goul Andersen does not look a decade ahead in his article in SCANDINAVIAN POLITICAL STUDIES, but he summarizes the trends of political lines back to the sixties. He claims that, irrespective of changes in party choices and activities among employees within the public and private sectors, the shifts which have taken place among the electorate are, after all, limited.

The fact that the Socialist People's Party and the Conservative Party have increased their support considerably does not necessarily imply any major

changes in the positions of the two parties on important issues. Far more voters than previously vote for the Conservative Party, but many of them do so without actually being Conservatives.

#### Not Discussing Crisis

Jørgen Goul Andersen, moreover, stresses that people no longer discuss the crisis of the welfare state the way they did it in the years after the epoch-making election in 1973. Positions advocated by the Progressive Party are also losing ground rapidly.

Instead of a major polarization involving strikes, political social unrest and militant grassroots movements--as predicted by the Institute for Future Research--Assistant Professor Jørgen Goul Andersen expects the political forces to move toward the center. The trends are toward a return to the stable party system of the sixties, with the voters focusing their attention on the four old parties (the Social Democratic Party, the Conservative Party, and the Radical Liberal Party) as well as the Socialist People's Party. The existence of the small parties thus becomes endangered.

#### Conjectures

Another social researcher at Århus University, Assistant Professor Erik Damgaard, Ph.D. in political science, tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that visions of the future like those launched by the Institute for Future Research contain elements of guesswork and thus also pitfalls. There are many unknown quantities which may present pitfalls: "Shifts in the composition according to the ages of the voters are a basis which may be established. Things are different when it comes to the political course. Here, of course, there is no automatic development. Whether trends are reinforced or weakened depends on the policy that will be pursued."

In a comment on the report, Preben Wilhjelm, M.A., former M.P. for the Socialist Left Party, says, among other things: "It is true that a major change will occur in the coming decade, but it seems too speculative to claim that it will originate in differences in life style. It smacks of impoverishment theory to assume that once people become really suppressed, they will become radicalized."

Historical experience shows that it is not those who are the most ignored within the society who become the most politically active. They are, to a larger extent found among the well-paid and the well-organized, cf., for example, the printers of the last generation."

Preben Wilhjelm, however, agrees with the authors of the reports that the next decade will present enormous problems: "Ten years of a generation have been lost. It is the young people who have been rejected who feel superfluous and unaccepted by the society as the victims of problems created by the employment policy and the economic policy," Wilhjelm says, and he concludes by saying: With greater inequalities within the society, a democracy such as the one that we have known so far cannot be expected to be maintained. In order for the Scandinavian model to survive, the inequalities within the society may not become too large."



POLITICAL

DENMARK

# LONG-RANGE SOCIAL CHANGES SEEN THREAT TO POLITICAL STABILITY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 10 Jun 86 p 7

[Article by Per Thygesen Poulsen: "On the Way to Turbo-Denmark"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] Differences in lifestyle and attitudes will increase in the next decade, according to a "future orientation" that has just been sent out by the Institute for Future Research. Attitudes in society will become considerably more conservative, but the gaps will be wider and there will be more conflicts.

"Turbo-Denmark" is on the way. A society in which a bigger percentage than before is moving to the right but in which other groups, some of them new ones, are moving in the opposite direction.

This is the most probable development in social attitudes up to 1996, according to the best guess of the Institute for Future Research. The view of the future was presented in the latest issue of the institute's FREMTIDS-ORIENTERING, a newsletter that is sent to subscribers eight times a year.

Differences in pay and differences in lifestyle will both increase between workers in the private and public sectors. This could result in conflicts, in which strikes, political and social unrest and militant grass-roots movements will be weapons in a struggle between different lifestyles.

On the one hand a hard-pressed group of public employees that the institute predicts will become more active in both union and party politics. They will move to the left while at the same time participating more in grass-roots movements and emphasizing leisure-time and family activities.

On the other the growing group of private employees who can increase their private consumption but participate less in social policy issues. There is a definite trend toward more salaried employees and fewer wage earners in the private sector. This means that more people will have a form of life in which the job is more important than one's leisure time. But this greater involvement in one's job and career will occur at the cost of union and political activities, grass-roots work and family life.

The young will be split between these two trends. One group will deal with the problem of youthful unemployment and limited access to higher education and training by means of an unusually large personal effort. The other will seek a niche in the social community and in leisure-time activities. The 15-24-year-old group is still more left-wing overall than the average person, but not as much as used to be the case.

At the same time liberalistic and market-oriented ideas will influence us due to a rise in the importation of American and West European ideas, especially in the form of TV and travel. And as households get smaller and more women continue to decide to work outside the home, more consumption and more activities will take place away from home, during people's free time and while they are at work.

Future researchers are aware that they may be on shaky ground.

"To a large extent this is an attempt to make this development impossible," wrote the institute's director, Rolf Jensen, and the editor of the newsletter, Steen Thomsen, who are jointly responsible for the report.

The changes in the population are fairly certain. But the anticipated changes in attitude will not automatically occur. In particular they pointed out that the threatened gap between public and private employees can be avoided through a change in government policy that allows public wages to keep up with those in the private sector. An intensified modernization program or substantial privatization could also change the picture.

6578

CSO: 3613/152



POLITICAL

DENMARK

**POLL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATS SHOWS MAJORITY PREFER SF TIE**

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Jun 86 p 12

[Text] The majority of Social Democratic voters prefer a Social Democratic, Socialist People's Party coalition, while only one fourth of the voters of the party prefer a Social Democratic minority government.

This appears from a poll taken by AIM in mid-May, when 1,311 voters were interviewed.

Most of the voters—44 percent—prefer either a Social Democratic, Socialist People's Party coalition or a Social Democratic minority government (34 percent and 10 percent, respectively). A somewhat smaller number (39 percent) want for the Four-Leaf-Clover government to continue, and 11 percent want other combinations. In this context, the poll shows that it is especially Radical Liberal voters who are divided in their views on the government formation.

Thirty percent of the Radical Liberal voters want the Four-Leaf-Clover government to continue, 20 percent want a Social Democratic, Socialist People's Party coalition and 15 percent a Social Democratic minority government. AIM finds it conceivable that the remaining 30 percent Radical Liberal voters have a Social Democratic, Radical Liberal coalition in mind.

The poll shows that there is a great difference in the positions of men and women on the question of the composition of the government. More women than men prefer a Social Democratic, Socialist People's Party coalition, and, correspondingly, more men than women want the Four-Leaf-Clover government to continue.

The debate on the content of the policy of a Social Democratic, Socialist People's Party coalition has had its effect, says AIM. Only 12 months ago, only 22 percent of the voters preferred a Social Democratic, Socialist People's Party coalition.

7262  
CSO: 3613/153

POLITICAL

FINLAND

BRIEFS

**BEIRUT PERSONNEL TO DAMASCUS**--Because of the unstable political situation in Beirut, the Finnish government has decided to transfer its Foreign Affairs Ministry personnel in Beirut to Damascus. Most of the personnel moved to Damascus on 17 May, and on Friday the embassy in the Syrian capital was also designated the place where Counselor Erik Brehmer, the legation's number-two man, will discharge his official duties starting in June. The Beirut legation will continue to function only with the aid of a locally hired staff. [Text] [Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 31 May 86 p 7] 12327

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21 July 1986

POLITICAL

GREECE

## DETAILS ON PROVISIONS OF BILL ON KYP RESTRUCTURING

## Bill Provisions

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 23 May 86 p 7

/Text/ The draft law introduced last night in the Chamber of Deputies by Minister to the Premier A. Tsokhatzopoulos provides that the director general of the Central Information Service /KYP/, which henceforth will be known as the National Information Service /EYP/, can be a member of the judiciary, a civil servant, or an active superior officer of the Armed Forces, the Post Corps or the Greek Police.

The bill also provides for two deputy directors and from reading its text one reaches the conclusion that following the Krystallis press humiliation /Krystallis was a former Greek Radio and TV employee, a KYP employee and allegedly a spy for third parties/, KYP will undergo "complete restructuring." It is noteworthy that "by presidential decree the services can be restructured, merged and abolished or new ones established."

In any case, this service, whether as KYP or EYP, is under the jurisdiction of Premier Papandreu who appoints the director general. It is not completely demilitarized even though it is characterized as an "independent civil service." The bill's basic points provide that EYP's jurisdiction will include the following:

--To gather, process and distribute to the proper authorities information concerning the country's security.

--To cope with spy activities by foreign information agencies at the expense of Greece.

--To coordinate, within the framework of decisions by the National Security Council /SEA/ and the premier, activities of all information and security services--activities connected with its objectives.

--To carry out any other related activity which is assigned to it by SEA or the premier.

--In the event of war or mobilization, EYP also becomes the country's Information Staff in addition to its regular activities.

--EYP's relations with other public services are regulated by SEA decisions which shall remain unpublished.

--EYP consists of KYP and its regional support services. KYP includes: a director general; two deputy directors; the director's Office of Staff Coordination; the office of the deputy director; the general director's office; and other independent sections.

--Presidential decrees may authorize the premier to regulate with adjustive decisions special issues, while with secret decisions, which shall not be published in the Government's Gazette, he can sanction EYP's internal regulations, its personnel composition, and placement.

--An Information Council is established composed of the following: the EYP director general, its chairman; the director of the Public Order Ministry's Security Branch; the director of the Second Mixed Staff Group of the National Defense General Staff; a Foreign Ministry representative who is appointed, as is his alternate by the foreign minister; and two persons and their alternates who are appointed by the premier depending on the nature of the issues under discussion.

--Representatives of other public services or Legal Entities of Public Law may participate in the Information Council by invitation of the chairman but they shall not have voting rights.

--Surplus personnel after each EYP restructure will be transferred to vacant or temporarily created positions in other public services. Such transfers will be made by joint decision of the premier and the appropriate minister on the basis of formal and substantive qualifications as well as on the needs of the public administration.

Personal administrative actions concerning appointments, transfers, status changes, transfers or other service changes of any nature or category concerning EYP personnel will not be published in the Government Gazette.

#### KYP Leadership

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 23 May 86 p 7

Article by Str. Kalogeropoulos: "Alexakis KYP Leader in Cyprus"

Text These days KYP is undergoing radical restructuring with an aim at conforming to its true national mission, that is, evaluating information relating to the country's security. Air Force Major General Makedos, who served as defense attache in the Greek Embassy in Washington, is appointed as KYP's new chief.



It is said that Major General Politis, until now KYP chief, will be transferred to another position--probably to a Legal Entity of Public Law organization. On the other hand, Colonel Alexakis, chief of KYP's security section, is transferred to the National Guard General Staff of Cyprus where he will assume corresponding duties. This position must be filled by a colonel and Alexakis is in line for promotion to brigadier general. This creates a problem as concerns his being appointed to the new position.

The director of the Second Section of the Army General Staff has the rank of major general and the corresponding positions in large Army units are occupied by colonels. With the new KYP restructure its second sector will be composed of a group of officers for processing the information relevant to national issues and security of the Armed Forces.

Another report states that a position is provided in KYP for a Foreign Ministry officer to whom will be referred all information concerning activities related to national issues by foreign minorities abroad.

The bill for KYP's restructure provides that its leader will report directly to the premier of the country with whom he will communicate directly without the use of "intermediaries".

Finally, by decision of the premier, KYP will maintain regular and close cooperation with the Independent Ministry of Public Order on matters concerning terrorism, prosecution of foreign agents, and aliens who enter Greece for suspicious purposes.

KYP branches or groups will be maintained in various sensitive areas of the country such as border-entry points and areas of the northern and eastern islands where they will cooperate with the minister for the Aegean.

The government spokesman said, in response to questions by reporters, that Colonel Giannis Alexakis will be transferred from KYP to Cyprus. His announcement raised other questions which remained unanswered. Among the answers spokesman Kourtis gave were:

--"No officer remains untransferrable."

--"I do not know if Alexakis will be replaced by Atsalakis."

--"I do not know the position he will assume in Cyprus."

--"I do not know when the transfer was decided."

--"The bill for KYP's restructure is under study."

--"For further details I refer you to the Defense Ministry."

--"I'll find out if the transfers to Cyprus are signed by the president."

It should be noted that government spokesman Papaloannou asked last Tuesday if Alexakis is being transferred, said: "He is not being transferred today. The question of transfers is an internal matter for each service. No one is untransferrable except...the municipal secretaries and the Pope..."

#### Provision on Parties, Trade Unions

Athens TA NEA in Greek 30 May 86 p 11

Text7 The bill the majority of the appropriate parliamentary committee voted on yesterday, which eliminates KYP and establishes EYP, forbids any intervention on the part of EYP's personnel for gathering information related to the activities of political parties and labor unions.

PASOK Deputy G. Katsimbardis asked that this provision be stated "in an explicit manner in order to completely avoid even the slightest deviation by EYP's agents toward recording the activities of parties and unions. The recommendation was accepted by Minister to the Premier Akis Tsokhatzopoulos who also made it clear that within 3 years EYP positions now being held by Armed Forces officers will gradually be filled by civilian personnel but that a small number of officers will be maintained as indispensable to the service's mission.

ND and KKE disagreed on both the principle and articles of the draft law.

7520

CSO: 3521/164



POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

MDP/CDE VIEWS OTHER POLITICAL ALLIANCES

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 May 86 p 2

[Excerpts] The MDP/CDE's debate on its policy of alliances has strengthened it. "It brought people back who had been keeping away. It led to an increase in the number of militants," say party leaders. The party's coalition with the PCP (in APU) during the legislative elections "ended when all the votes had been counted." If early elections were held now, an agreement with other political forces would not be excluded.

The MDP's real influence "is not reflected in parliament where it has three deputies," said Goncalves Andre at a press conference yesterday. He reminded those present of the "decisive role" it played in Eanes' 1980 reelection campaign and the role it played in the 1986 election.

"The MDP has its own platform and its political background differs from the PCP's." He added that a "false 'me too' image has been created" which its activity in parliament, for example, has shown not to be a true image.

"So many votes are unanimous! We are neither communists nor anticommunists. We defend the right of parties to exist. That we do. If anything can be said to be characteristic of us is our ability to discuss things," he also added.

The alliance with the PCP seems to have been shaken this year. "There have been new political developments." The MDP has held meetings with the PS and the PRD and it has taken stands in parliamentary votes. Furthermore, the creation of the PRD, which ran alone and formed a solid parliamentary group, is, perhaps, one reason for the debate within the MDP. However, its leadership does not explicitly admit to it.

"Some militants insist the PCP is harming the MDP," said Ilidio Pereira, a member of the political committee. "However, it is not new for our party to draw up a policy of alliances. We already had these concerns back in 1984, prior to the fifth congress."

The MDP now wants to widen the discussions. It has held many meetings in all districts and had "productive discussions that open new avenues."

The local level alliance with the PCP remains in effect. It did not expire when the vote counting was done. It was approved at a party congress and a decision to break away from it can only be made at a similar forum. Furthermore, the MDP leadership does not conceal the "quantitative gain" made in the last elections. Despite the loss of seven town halls, they say they "have more militants elected of office than ever before."

9935/9435

CS0: 3542/105



POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

# JARDIM SEEN HOLDING REAL POWER WITHIN PSD

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 31 May 86 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva]

[Text] At the congress of the PSD-Madeira, Alberto Joao Jardim threatened Cavaco Silva by saying that "in Lisbon no one will interfere with the rights of the PSD-Madeira and, if they do, there will be another party in Portugal."

At the congress of the PSD-Madeira, Alberto Joao Jardim rebuked Cavaco Silva by saying that he did not want "to hear any more talk about the presidential election," after Cavaco referred explicitly to the results of the last election for the Presidency of the Republic.

At the congress of the PSD-Madeira, Alberto Joao Jardim declared himself ready to protect Cavaco Silva in saying that if anyone attempts to resurrect the groups which existed before the Figueira da Foz, he will go to the continent "to bury them."

In view of this, one is prompted to ask: What power does Alberto Joao Jardim have to be able to threaten, rebuke and finally set himself up as a protector of the all-powerful leader of the PSD?

Alberto Joao Jardim has not only power but also statesmanship.

Let us begin here. To what extent does this distinguish Alberto Joao Jardim from Mota Amaral, the other leader on the islands, who has power but not statesmanship?

The current chairman of the PSD-Madeira is one of the few men whom the exercise of politics did not cause to lose a certain amount of authenticity.

Impulsive, defiant and an extrovert, he has accustomed the people to speak without respecting the social amenities.

Not taking time to weigh his words and, for this reason, frequently contradicting himself, Alberto Joao Jardim has on the other hand the rare instinct of perceiving at crucial moments what the public wants to hear and say.

This has produced a strong feeling of empathy between him and the people who come under his leadership.

With some politicians attention is paid particularly to the weak points, forgetting the accomplishments.

With Alberto Joao Jardim we have the reverse--a phenomenon which seems to be a privilege of populist leaders: In his case, the Madeira citizens pay special attention to the strong points and ostensibly overlook the defects.

The feeling of empathy and confidence established between Alberto Joao Jardim and the people of the archipelago is the big trump card held by the Madeira leader in his relations with the PSD central directorate.

As for Cavaco Silva, he was fairly successful in handling the lobbies, pressure groups and strong men within the party, but he is unable to put an end to the influence of the island leader.

Any measure taken by the central power against Alberto Joao Jardim would serve only to strengthen the complicity between the Madeira residents and their leader and would certainly result in serious disturbances.

Thus, Alberto Joao Jardim is one of the few men in the PSD who have real power.

And combining this power with his statesmanship--ardent and uncontrolled--Alberto Joao enjoys a peculiar position within the PSD: He is perhaps the only man who can tell the leader whatever comes into his head.

With a few reservations, to be sure.

For putting aside his lack of respect for the social amenities, Alberto Joao Jardim has also accustomed the country not to exceed certain limits with those whom he considers to be more powerful than himself.

8568

CSO: 3542/112



POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

## **POLITICAL EQUATION CHANGES, BECOMES CLEARER**

### **Parties Divided Into Center, Extremes**

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 10 May 86 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva]

[Text] A new political scene has emerged as a result of Adriano Moreira's victory in the CDS and Vitor Constancio's (very probable) step up as leader of the PS.

It must be said that this new scene is considerably different from the previous one.

The PSD was previously the pivot of the political system. It allied itself with the Left at one point (the PS) to form a centrist alliance and later it joined the Right (the CDS) to form a conservative alliance.

The situation is different in the new scene. We now have two parties at the extremes and two at the political center and no expectation of an alliance among them.

The PCP and the CDS, the two parties at the extremes, now show various close similarities.

First, both parties claim to have tested and established ideologies: Marxism-Leninism and the church's social doctrine. They are also led by older men who began their political career in the heyday of the Salazar regime. Finally, both are condemned to an isolated existence without hope of getting into office because of the improbability that others will choose them as coalition partners.

We have two other parties in the center of the political spectrum which also have some common characteristics, despite the deep differences in style separating them. These two are the PS and the PSD.

First, neither one of them has an ideology per se. Both are condemned to govern in an empirical manner, which means that they look for case by case solutions to emerging problems.

Secondly, both parties will be led by young men (as soon as Constancio assumes the PS's leadership) who have had more technical than political training and only came to the public eye after 25 April.

Lastly, they both seem to want to govern alone.

As we can see the scene is in clear focus. There are two parties at the extremes led by experienced men. These two parties are destined to remain in opposition. There are also two parties in the center led by technocrats in their 40's who are destined to alternate in office.

But, what about the PRD?

The PRD is a party that, by its very nature, will introduce a dynamic factor to this stable framework.

It is very likely that the democratic renewalists will not ally themselves with the PCP or the CDS. However, they may float from supporting the PSD to supporting the PS according to political circumstances.

It is known that Ramalho Eanes admires Cavaco Silva for his decisiveness and determination. It is also known that he likes Vitor Constancio. Constancio not only has technical expertise, he was also one of the PS's leaders who never followed Mario Soares in criticizing Gen Ramalho Eanes.

Eanes and the PRD will, as a result, have no reservations about supporting governments headed by either one or the other.

In addition, the simple fact that Ramalho Eanes was president of the republic indicates he will not want to get the negative and unpopular image of being someone who foments instability thus making him someone who brings down governments.

Given this, it is not difficult to foresee what will happen in the near future. The Democratic Renewal Party will support the present government as long as it has a good public image and the PRD has no reasonable alternative. It will remove its support for the government when it feels the government's public image has deteriorated and Vitor Constancio and the PS have become a credible alternative.

This is how the PRD will behave.

We will have governments (except for new and unforeseeable changes) headed by Cavaco Silva and Vitor Constancio in the coming years. Ramalho Eanes will either endorse them or not as he continues to cultivate his "distant" image.

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 17 May 86 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva]

[Excerpts] Last week this column addressed the issues of the new political scene we now have in Portugal. As we said, there is a new party arrangement, a new party came into being and there are new faces.

Many things have changed and these changes have brought greater clarity to the political system.

The dividing lines separating the parties from one another are sharper and the parties themselves tend to accept themselves as they are in a more direct manner. However, not only does the new scene give us a clearer reading of the situation; it also has other advantages.

The main advantage is that it favors single party governments to be formed.

In reality, the CDS's evolution to the right, the PCT's excessive sectarianism and the PRD's reservations to form alliances in the near future, lead the PS and PSD to lean toward forming governments alone, without coalitions. Now, one party governments are more effective because they are able to make decisions faster and they have clearer policies than multiparty governments.

The second advantage of the new political arrangement is that it makes voting easier.

In fact, when political parties go before the electorate individually with the intent of forming a government alone, the voters make quicker decisions in choosing the party they like and the government they wish to have.

For example, if we keep in mind that the most probable alternatives are the PSD and the PS, the voters will have a choice between a Cavaco Silva led government and one led by Vitor Constancio.

The third advantage of this new arrangement is that it will give politics a push because the loser will have to step down from office. We will not have a repeat of 1983 when the AD (in which the PSD was the largest party) was defeated and the PSD remained in office in a coalition with the Socialist Party.

All in all, there seems to be no doubts that the new political arrangement is better than the old one. It is clearer, more open and more ethical.

What we now want is not to have partisan politics or obscure interests taint a game that finally seems to be governed by clear rules.

9935/9435

CSO: 3542/105



POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

# PCP REPORTEDLY READY TO ADAPT TO NEW REALITIES

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 31 May 86 pp 1, 24

[Excerpt] According to information received by EXPRESSO from party sources, Communist leader Angelo Veloso is scheduled to transfer from Porto to Lisbon, settling in the capital from next week on, with the specific objective of conducting ideological work within the PCP.

According to the same sources, this development denotes the emphasis which certain PCP sectors have been giving recently to the need for more in-depth discussion and theoretical elaboration (as was apparent, for example, in the recent presidential election in which Veloso was a candidate) so that the party might better adapt to the country's new realities and those of a rapidly changing world.

Moreover, it will be interesting to note the similarity between this type of internal discussion and that pursued within the CGTP-IN in anticipation of the upcoming congress. Just this week, in public statements, Director Jose Luis Judas alluded to the urgency with which that union organization should get into the new questions facing the labor sector, such as Portugal's entry into the EEC, or the scientific and technical revolution with workers increasingly replacing cotton suits with white smocks.

According to certain individuals with whom we spoke, there have been recent indications in PCP circles that ideological questions and attention to the development of new theoretical concepts have become increasingly important. For example, our attention was called to the "highly unusual" fact that, according to TASS, one of the questions broached at the recent Cunhal/Gorbachev meeting was "the theoretical and political activity of the CPSU and the PCP in the present phase of development of those two countries."

In addition, we may cite increasing discussion among the party's intellectual organizations which, in the case of Porto, is culminating in the scheduling of the sector's first assembly in November, to be attended by Alvaro Cunhal himself. As for Lisbon, mention is made of the establishment of a ("counterpoint") cooperative which will distribute video cassettes to rank-and-file organizations as a form of "alternative information" to that presented by television or other media.

8368

CSO: 3542/112

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

# POWER SEEN DIVIDED INTO THREE SEPARATE POLES

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 17 May 86 p 6

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa]

[Excerpts] Despite the fact that it is much more recent than the French, the Portuguese semi-presidential system has already experienced the cohabitation that is now appearing in captivating France. We had cohabitation for years, since 1980, with Gen Eanes in Belem and the Democratic Alliance in Sao Bento. When we recall the tension that existed, we can understand the difficulties caused by cohabitation.

Of course, in Portugal all elected presidents make it a point to say that their majorities disappear at election time, especially if they needed the PCP's vote to win. This is not the case in France where one frequently hears talk of a presidential majority.

Meanwhile, in one case as in the other, the nitty-gritty of it all is that is is much more important to speak of the solidity of a presidential majority if the political direction of his election coincides with parliamentary election results and to what point he is overshadowed by the prime minister and his government.

If we look at these factors, it is obvious that from 1980 to 1983 cohabitation existed in Portugal. It even led to a clash over the direction the revision of the constitution took in 1982.

Although Dr Mario Soares may say there is no cohabitation, it obviously does not change the constitutional powers he has been given, it does not alter the political meaning of his election, nor does it make him the chief of parliamentary state who must passively accept the policies of consecutive governments.

The only reason there is no cohabitation is that we now have, in a strict sense, a triangle [menage a trois].

We had cohabitation when there was a parliamentary majority and a government formed from that majority which had a different orientation and was even opposed to the president of the republic who won a reelection in 1980.

Now, the situation is even more complex. We have a socialist president of the republic who was elected by a union of the left, a social democratic government and an Assembly of the Republic with no majority.

While in cohabitation there are two poles, the presidential on one side and the parliamentary/governmental on the other, the "menage a trois" has three poles. It has the presidential poles, the parliamentary and the governmental. None of them are initially similar to the others.

In one word, if cohabitation excites public opinion in France, what can be said about our peaceful Portugal which has already been through cohabitation and is now experiencing an even more ungovernable formula of "menage a trois"?

Let us examine the "menage a trois" that we have. Let us consider the originality of having a government wanting to lead in one direction, a parliament that passes laws in the opposite direction and a president of the republic who arbitrates as he waits for the moment when the government's decline coincides with his 1991 reelection strategy. In the meantime, the president makes appearances everywhere to show the public that he is one of those poles of power that was legitimized by universal suffrage.

How much longer will this sweet illusion that the "menage a trois" is great for the nation remain?

How much longer will the tremendous prestige of the prime minister and his correct macroeconomic measures hide the true impossibility of making structural reforms?

How much longer will the government's succession of parliamentary defeats continue? How much longer will the assembly pass legislation that is contrary to the main points of the government's program (that is approved)?

What will the outcome of this fragmentation of power, a fragmentation that goes beyond the healthy division of power?

For some the outcome lies in a new PS-PSD alliance to be headed by the PSD and prepared to reelect Dr Soares in 1991.

However, we cannot see very well how the PSD can accept such support from the outset of how the PS can resign itself to being second for a long time. We also cannot see what the nation will gain from what Duverger calls, even in experienced France, the mire of patronage and corruption.

For others it lies in a PS-PSD alliance headed by the PS with the same goal of assuring a Soares victory in 1991. It is more difficult to see how the PSD can abandon its leading position in Portuguese party politics.

For yet others, the problem does not arise because the PSD alone will obtain a parliamentary majority. This is an encouraging ideal. However, it is unachievable under the present electoral system. If we consider that not even during this grace period (which, experience has shown, is at its maximum



between 4 and 9 months of office) has the PSD been able to surpass 36 percent in public opinion polls. How can we expect the 44 or 45 percent when there is more wear and tear on the government?

#### To Allow Things To Move Along or Not?

Four possibilities remain: consider changing the electoral system, prepare a PSD-CDS parliamentary majority, prolong the minority government's stay in office with overall CDS and PRD parliamentary support, or simply do not think of the future...

We have proposed a change of the electoral system for a long time. Now, it has become impossible. What is advantageous to the PSD and the PS is not advantageous to the PRD, the PCP and for the most part for the CDS also. In addition, should there be a presidential veto (which is very probable), where could a two thirds majority be found as article 139 (number 3) of the constitution stipulates?

To prepare a PSD-CDS parliamentary majority implies the existence of basic understandings between the two parties and their leaders. It also implies a desire on the part of the CDS to have such an alliance at this very low point in its parliamentary strength and that the PSD would control the time of elections. Now, it is Dr Soares who controls when elections are held. Those elections could, at a given time, provide that majority but at a later time, with the PS on an electoral upswing, the PSD and CDS could fall short of it.

As for a parliamentary agreement with the CDS and the PRD, it is necessary to have what one agrees to the other vouch for on a case by case basis. Gen Eanes must for the PRD to support the government consistently without it destroying the party internally. Polls show that it has already lost one third of its voters. The PS's recovery must not make the position of a very new party, one that has been made a crutch for someone else's government without honor or glory, unfeasible.

It can be tempting for the PSD to support the PRD because as long as it exists (even with 5 or 6 percent of the vote) it will always be an obstacle to the PS as it tries to make electoral gains.

It remains to be seen how far a party accepts to be used by another kamikaze style in light fire.

9935/12948  
CSO: 3542/106

## POLITICAL

## PORTUGAL

## POLL INDICATES POLITICIANS' POPULARITY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 17 May 86 p 6

[Text] Although Cavaco Silva scored 15 percentage points higher than Mario Soares and 20 points higher than his own government in a popularity poll, he also arouses a remarkable amount of negative opinion. Out of those people polled, 10.8 percent believe he has performed badly or very badly while only 3.7 percent believe this to be the case with Mario Soares.

There is no middle ground of opinion about Cavaco Silva. People are either for or against him. Few people are undecided or say they have no opinion about his performance (5 percent as opposed to 15 percent in Soares' case and 8 percent for the government). A low percentage of people consider his performance neither good nor bad (27.8 percent opposed to 50.2 percent for Soares and 48.6 percent for the government). On the other hand, while the president of the republic has a "very good" image among 5.3 percent of the population and the government only 6.6 percent, the prime minister's very good rating is 18.2 percent.

The favorable responses he gets from people who support the five main political parties are even more significant. Among PSD and CDS supporters, he has an approval rating of over 90 percent (92.2 and 90.5 percent respectively). Among PS and PRD supporters he has close to 50 percent (49.6 and 49.3 percent). Among APU supporters, the unfavorable rating (39.5 percent) is only slightly higher than the favorable one (37.5 percent). Furthermore, it is only with APU and abstentionists that Cavaco Silva obtains a significant amount of negative reaction. He gets a negative reaction from 17 percent of the abstentionists. He has greater support in the north (68.2 percent) than in the south (55.9 percent). It is also greater in rural areas (68.7 percent) than in urban areas (54.2 percent).

The president of the republic has less support among PSD (37.5 percent) than among CDS supporters (42.9 percent). He is least popular with APU voters (32 percent) who see him in the worst light. Unlike the prime minister, Soares has greater support in urban areas (50.1 percent) than in rural areas (42.1 percent).

The government is seen less favorably than its prime minister. PSD and CDS support declines to about 60 percent (65.3 and 59.9 percent respectively).

PS and PRD support declines to about 30 percent (29.1 and 30.9 percent). Only 15.2 percent of APU's voters support it. It is curious to note that only 6.6 percent of the PS' voters and 3.3 percent of the PRD and CDS' voters disapprove of its performance.

#### Constancio and Gama at Same Level in PS

Socialist voters are equally divided in their support for Vitor Constancio (40.1 percent) and Jaime Gama (39 percent). The former governor of the Bank of Portugal has a clear advantage outside the party, especially to the left of the political spectrum. Jaime Gama only has a slight advantage in the PSD with 29 percent as opposed to 22 percent for Constancio. Gama loses in the CDS and by an even wider margin in the PRD and APU.

It should be noted that PRD voters, who have been the center of debates between the two socialist leaders, have a worse opinion of Jaime Gama (22.2 percent) than they do of Constancio (8.4 percent).

The Azorean politician also has a clearly negative image among APU voters (38.7 percent to Constancio's 3.0 percent). As the graphs for both candidates show, Jaime Gama is stronger to the right while Constancio is clearly ahead among those people who support leftist parties. It is only in the CDS that the former finance minister obtains a considerable amount (24.6 percent) of "bad" or "very bad" reactions.

Finally, we note that Vitor Constancio has a better approval rating in urban centers (45.7 percent and 25.8 percent for Gama) and among males (46.4 percent to Gama's 30.8 percent).

#### Cunhal Has Most Negative Image

Among present party leaders, Alvaro Cunhal is the least liked (16.4 percent) and the one who elicits the most negative opinions (49.6 percent). As with Cavaco Silva, people are either for or against Alvaro Cunhal. There is only a small number of people undecided. Only 15 percent of those polled said they had formed no opinion about the Communist leader. In the case of Ramalho Eanes 35.2 percent of those polled had not formed an opinion about him while 52.2 percent had not formed an opinion of Adriano Moreira.

The president of the CDS has the distinction of having 52.2 percent of his party's voters showing neither a positive or negative opinion of his performance. The poll shows that 40.3 percent consider his performance to be good.

Alvaro Cunhal also gets many APU voters (40.1 percent) showing neither a positive or negative attitude towards him. APU voters even prefer Eanes (57.3 percent) to Cunhal (50 percent).

It is also worth noting that Eanes gets a low margin of negative responses (9.5 percent) from PS supporters.





Good  
Very good 48.1  
So-so 50.2  
Bad  
Very bad 3.7  
Bad



Good  
Very good 61.4  
So-so 27.8  
Bad  
Very bad 10.8  
Bad





Good  
Very good 38.0  
So-so 48.0  
Bad  
Very bad 12.4  
Bad



Good  
Very good 44.2  
So-so 46.6  
Bad  
Very bad 9.2  
Bad



Good  
Very good 30.2  
So-so 49.8  
Bad  
Very bad 20.2  
Bad



9935/12766  
CSO: 3542/108

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

**TIGHTER BORDER CONTROL**--The government proposes to begin controlling entries to and departures from Portugal. Currently these controls do not exist. It is going to restructure the Alien Service, which will change its name to the Alien and Border Service, to perform this task. A new organic law will be passed to strengthen this service's operation and widen its jurisdiction. The service's responsibility is now limited to foreigners who remain in Portugal, not those people who are simply passing through. It is not notified of their entries and departures until 48 hours after the fact. The Alien and Border Service will station its employees in each land, air or naval border post. Another objective of the restructuring will be to improve the department's liaison with the Fiscal Guard which is now solely responsible for border control. Starting Monday, the Alien and Border Service will have a new director. He is Pinto Pereira and he comes from the National Civil Defense Service. He succeeds Ladeiro Monteiro who now heads the Security Information Service. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 10 May 86 p 24] 9935/12948

**LIBYAN RAID CONDEMNED**--A majority of Portuguese condemn the bombing of two Libyan cities ordered by the President of the United States. Only about one-fourth (24.3 percent) of those polled agreed with Ronald Reagan. Among all political persuasions in Portugal, there are more people who disagree than agree with the action taken against Qadhafi: 93.3 percent of APU's supporters, 79.2 percent of the PRD's and 70.7 percent of the PS's. Reagan's support increases among supporters of conservative parties: PSD 50 percent condemn the American raid and 43 percent support it while in the CDS 48.8 percent disagree with the American action while 43 percent support it. [Excerpt] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 17 May 86 p 3] 9935/12948

**POSITIVE CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE**--The current account balance for 1985 was positive by \$411 million (65.161 million contos), according to provisional data published by the Bank of Portugal. This account was \$520 million in the red in 1984 and in the previous 2 years it was negative by \$1,640 million and \$3,200 million respectively. This improvement was the result of a decrease in the trade balance deficit by \$572 million and a positive balance for tourism totaling \$902 million and unilateral transfers of \$2,228 million (of which \$2,093 million came from emigrant remittances). The basic balance, which is the total of current transactions and medium- to long-term capital, also showed a positive balance of \$1,426 million (248.372 million contos). [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 May 86 p 4] 9935/12948



POLITICAL

SWEDEN

# LABOR UNION CHIEF MALM EXPLAINS DIFFERENCES WITH SDP POLICIES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 29 May 86 p 6

[Article by Anders Jonsson]

[Text] LO (Federation of Trade Unions) chairman Stig Malm is concerned over the government's economic policy. In an interview with SVENSKA DAGBLADET, he questioned whether it was truly Social Democratic.

Malm promised a strong offensive by LO on distribution policy over the next few years. He is convinced that the government will pay careful attention to the demands of the organized labor movement.

"I am concerned over their reasoning in the area of economic policy. I am worried by the discussion over what goals are important and what policies are Social Democratic," Malm said during the interview at Sturup Airport.

## Attacks Currency Policy

He had made a quick trip to Malmo to speak at the congress of the Commercial Employers' Association. In his speech at the congress, Malm sharply criticized the intentions of the government and of the national bank to ease currency restrictions so that it would become possible for Swedish companies to export money for investments abroad.

He continued on this topic at the airport.

"Considering the problems we still have with low investments, it is difficult to see that a liberalization of the credit market is what we need just now."

## 'Third Way' At Risk

According to Malm, if currency restrictions are eased it will destroy the very foundation of the so-called third way in economic policy. After all, the devaluation of 1982 and the restraint of the unions in wage negotiations were the causes of high profits, which were justified by the need to increase investments in Sweden.

If investments are not sufficiently high, the government must step in with other measures, according to Stig Malm, who would like to see higher investments in combination with a higher share of corporate profits taken by the state for other purposes. The goal of all this is to increase employment levels, which is the most important aspect of the wealth-redistribution policy.

#### Higher Interest Rates

"How can I justify low wage demands when the finance minister says there is so much money floating around in our companies that it is all right for them to sent money abroad?" Malm asked.

"The flow of 15 to 17 billion kronor out of the country, which can be anticipated if the proposed relaxed restrictions are implemented, could also result in higher interest rates and, thus, higher inflation. This would mean throwing the 'third way' out the window."

#### Government Will Listen

Of course, the LO chairman does not believe that this will happen. During our trip from Malmo to Stockholm, he stated again and again that the government would be forced to listen to LO. When LO raises its voice, the government must consider what it says.

There is also the question of how a Social Democratic finance minister, in a revised budget, can support ideas that LO sees as a deathblow to the Social Democrats' own policies.

"I have read several books that are not particularly old and that were strongly criticized by LO and others," said Stig Malm, who was thinking about the controversial book of interviews with Kjell-Olof Feldt and Berndt Ahlqvist's I Bracklig Farkost (In a Fragile Ship).

#### Wind In Sails

"The proposals made in these books have not been turned into practical policies, to any great extent," Malm said. He said this was the result of LO's work.

In general, the LO chairman feels he has the wind in his sails. The earlier move to the right, which even affected the LO unions and the Social Democratic Party has turned and is now a move to the left.

His comment on the nonsocialist opposition's talk about the government's carrying out nonsocialist policies was that there was nothing else they could say and still retain their credibility.

#### Active Distribution Policy

After the election, LO has successfully pushed for an increase in the sales tax on stocks, higher unemployment compensation, higher child allowances next year, and higher partial pensions.

The effort to raise the lowest wages during the wage negotiations is another sign that redistribution policy has been stressed since last fall.

"Since the election, except for an interruption for the death of Olof Palme, we have pushed for a more active redistribution policy. That which was called the 'Dala Revolt' was actually just a continuation of what we had done previously."

Stig Malm predicts that the criticism from the Dala Revolt and elsewhere against low wages and for a more active redistribution policy will be heard once again when it is seen that profits this year will be even higher than last year.

#### New Political Period

"I foresee a series of problems related to redistribution policy," he said.

Assuming that the dark clouds that are gathering over the labor market do break loose in a storm that washes away the recent improvements in the economy, Stig Malm believes that we will enter a new period in Swedish politics.

"As the economy improves more and more, questions of the redistribution of wealth and the quality of life will take on more and more importance," he said.

#### Discussion On Justice

He promised that the LO Congress this September would be characterized by discussions concerning justice. Among other things, LO will examine the redistribution of wealth that occurred during the economic crisis since the late 1970's.

"I am convinced that this congress will be a good springboard to the future in questions of justice," said Stig Malm, comparing it to the LO Congress of 1971.

It was then that LO, under the leadership of Arne Geijer, made the demands that led later in the 1970's to a series of labor reforms, such as the job-security law and the codetermination law.

9336

CSO: 3650/235



POLITICAL

SWEDEN

CONSERVATIVE PAPER DOUBTS CARLSSON'S STRONG POSITION TO LAST

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 26 May 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Carlsson's Movement"]

[Text] Seldom have Swedish Social Democrats seemed stronger than they are today. Both the party and the party leader are high in the opinion polls. The government is facing no real problems in parliament. Its theoretical dependence on VPK (Left Party Communists) seems to play no major role in practice. The government has managed to deal on a regular basis with one of the opposition parties, without needing to pay any particularly high price in the form of political concessions.

It is undeniably the day of the Social Democrats. But does this mean that tomorrow belongs to the Social Democrats, as well?

Actually, it was not until after World War II that the Swedish Social Democrats managed to attain that special position that we now associate with the party. Following internal struggles during the first decades of the century, Swedish Social Democrats clearly embraced reformism. Society was to be changed in a socialist direction by peaceful and democratic means.

The reformist policy was formulated in a serious manner during the economic crisis of the early 1930's. The Social Democratic government lived in symbiosis with capitalist business. Gradually, however, governmental power expanded. This effort was directed, primarily, toward the social conditions of the people.

Business created the resources and the state distributed them. Social Democratic socialism came more and more to mean a collectivization of the people's income, rather than nationalization of companies.

This reformist recipe was followed until the late 1960's. With the pension reform of 1959, however, Social Democracy took its second step. What the party's own rhetoric called Social Democracy was fully implemented.

Consequently, there was great confusion among Social Democrats during the late sixties. What should they do, now that they had reached their goal of security for all?

Various answers were given.

One was social radicalism. After the security reforms, equality reforms were to follow. It was not enough that people were living well. The task at hand was to even out the social and economic differences that existed, although the level of prosperity was extremely high by international standards.

Another answer reflected more than economic radicalism. The reform effort would now be extended to business, as well. Active control of the development of business was a natural next step after the major collectivization of savings represented by the ATP (General Supplementary Pension System) reform. The debate over wage-earner funds followed as a continuation of this effort.

A third answer was given within the labor movement. Until the late sixties and early seventies the labor organizations had devoted themselves primarily to the products of labor. Now the content of labor was pushed to the forefront. The approach was classic socialism. The target of their efforts was power within companies. Eventually, the major labor-rights reforms were implemented: the codetermination law, job-security laws, and the worker-representation law.

The policy of social reform that had characterized Social Democratic rule from the early 1930's to the end of the 1960's had gained general support. The Social Democrats had become Sweden's governing party during the postwar years precisely because of this policy and not because of any other.

Similar support was never won for the policy of equality, the economic policy, or the demand for reform on the job. In fact, all three projects ended in fiasco.

The policy of equality resulted in the effort to build more daycare centers and in the uniform school policy. These efforts were intended to give everyone an equal start in life. Both the daycare and school policies have now become a burden to the Social Democrats. The highly progressive taxes that were another expression of the policy of equality represent another major problem for today's Social Democrats. On the one hand, these taxes always create problems in wage negotiations and, on the other hand, it is practically impossible for the Social Democrats to achieve internal support for tax reforms that reduce marginal taxes.

The active economic policy failed before it was even formalized. Matters were even worse for the wage-earner funds. The fund policy of the Swedish Social Democrats is a political failure of historic proportions. They wasted 10 years of political effort trying to carry out a project that even their own supporters did not want carried out.

The new policies on working conditions have become nothing but bureaucracy. There is hardly a union member today who would thank his union for the labor-rights reforms that were made during the early 1970's.

The strength of the Social Democrats is that they have actually renounced all three of these policies that were formulated during the late sixties after the

time of their social reforms. The election campaign of 1985 sounded like a defense of what had been done during the fifties and sixties. Since this was perceived as being the real battle, the government once again received the confidence of the people.

But Swedish Social Democracy cannot live forever defending the social policies of Gustav Moller. Sooner or later, Social Democrats must begin to look forward, unless they are prepared to renounce their own reformism completely.

But it is extremely difficult today to detect any signs of such a renewal of their policies. The Social Democratic Party's leadership stubbornly continues to harp on the right wingers and their much-cherished neoliberals. The Social Democrats are probably more dependent on the latter, their favorite enemies, than anything else. As long as the threat appears credible, their own activists and members need do nothing but carry on a defensive battle.

But what answer will Ingvar Carlsson's Social Democrats give if someone happens to ask what they actually intend to do themselves? Can Ingvar Carlsson even say that there is someone in his movement who is thinking about that question?

9336

CSO: 3650/235



POLITICAL

SWEDEN

# **LIBERALS, COMMUNISTS BIGGEST LOSERS AS SDP POSTS POLL RECORD**

## **Sympathy Wave for Carlsson**

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 May 86 p 11

[Article by Dick Ljungberg]

[Text] The Liberal Party and the Left Party-Communists [VPK] were the losers as the wave of sympathy following Olof Palme's assassination carried the Social Democratic Party [SDP] to a record high of 46 percent in the party preference poll for April that was conducted by DAGENS NYHETER and the IMU [Institute for Market Research]. A separate poll on confidence in Ingvar Carlsson's government also showed record-high figures.

The previous IMU poll was completed just before Olof Palme's assassination. It showed the SDP at a very low level (38 percent). That was in the wake of the squabble in the labor movement over redistribution policy, the chief manifestation of which the so-called Dale uprising.

In that poll, it was the Liberals and the VPK that were making headway, but in April things were just the reverse again.


The current poll—which comprised 887 interviews—was conducted during the period from 7 to 30 April. It therefore does not reflect any possible shifts in public opinion as a result of the nuclear accident in Chernobyl, which was discovered in Sweden on 29 April.

Here are the results of the IMU's April poll compared to the February poll:

Social Democrats: 46.0 percent (+8.0 percent); Liberal Party: 19.0 (-5.0); Conservative Party: 17.5 (+1.0); Center Party: 10.0 (+0.5); VPK: 4.0 (-2.5); KDS [Christian Democratic Union]: 1.0 (-1.0); Environment Party: 2.5 (-0.5); and all others: 0.0. There were 3.5 percent who either could not or would not say which was the "best party." The changes for the SDP, the Liberal Party, and the VPK are statistically reliable.

This means that the socialist bloc is again larger than the nonsocialist bloc. The SDP and VPK combined are supported by 50 percent of the voters, compared

# DAGENS NYHETER-IMU Poll



The SDP has a record-high 46 percent in the DAGENS NYHETER-IMU poll of voter preferences for April. At the same time, the Liberal Party's upward curve has been broken, while the Center Party seems to have stabilized at around the 10-percent mark. The Conservatives are remaining fairly stable, and the VPK is back down to 4 percent.

to 47.5 percent for the nonsocialists, including the KDS. In the February poll, the nonsocialists were ahead by 52 percent to 44.5 percent.

The April poll by SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] also gives the SDP a high rating: 47 percent. And this is also confirmed by a separate IMU poll in April concerning confidence in Ingvar Carlsson's government.

That IMU poll shows that a full 77.6 percent of those interviewed—the highest figure ever recorded—have some degree of confidence in the government. The corresponding figure in January–February was 57.5 percent. The number having very great confidence in the government has risen from 9.8 to 18.7 percent.

The sympathy wave for Ingvar Carlsson has even affected nonsocialist voters. Nearly 55 percent of them say they have confidence in the government, compared to 32 percent in February. But only a few nonsocialist voters say they have very great confidence in the government.

So the Liberal Party's upward curve, which had been rising steadily since before the election, has been broken. Whether this is temporary or not will not be known until this fall. But in the IMU poll, the Liberal Party is still well above its surprisingly good election result of 14.2 percent.

The Conservatives are still at the low level that has been theirs since the election, which gave them 21.3 percent—a disappointment to the party. Party chairman Ulf Adelsohn is now rushing around the country to try to put fresh spirit into the party members.

The Center Party seems to have stabilized at around the 10-percent mark, which is approximately what it achieved in its disastrous election result. The fact that Karin Soder will become party chairwoman has not yet given the party a boost. Its fellow party, the KDS, is also leading a languishing life.

The VPK is always affected by the mood in the SDP. It benefited from the SDP's internal squabbles following the presentation of the budget in January and was up to 6.5 percent in the February poll, compared to its 5.4 percent in the election. Now the VPK is back to more normal figures.

Voters Like Carlsson Style

JPRS-WER-86-072  
21 July 1986

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 May 86 p 11

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "An Exceptionally Successful Start"]

[Text] The IMU's voter barometer for April shows a record-high 46 percent for the SDP, with corresponding declines for the Liberals and the VPK. In the February poll—before Olof Palme's assassination—the situation was just the reverse, with increases for the Liberals and the VPK and a sharp decline for the SDP. The order has therefore been reversed, at least temporarily.

It is not possible to draw any far-reaching conclusions from this voter barometer. Ingvar Carlsson has been surfing on the wave of sympathy following



Olof Palme's assassination, and the nuclear accident in Chernobyl may cause equally great upheavals. The only safe conclusion is that Ingvar Carlsson has made an exceptionally successful start. Both as prime minister and as Social Democratic Party leader.

Two things have contributed to that success. First, Ingvar Carlsson has been acting in a calm and confidence-inspiring manner, and second, the reactions of many nonsocialist voters are marked by signs of a hangover following the assassination of their "hate object," Palme.

The fact that Ingvar Carlsson is in a very strong position in voter opinion—at least so far—is confirmed by the IMU's poll concerning confidence in the government.

Never before has a poll of that kind shown such an emphatic and clear-cut result in favor of a government in office. The poll shows that Ingvar Carlsson enjoys great personal credibility even among nonsocialist voters.

How long this unique position with the electorate will continue is hard to say. The traditional antagonisms in society have not diminished following Palme's assassination, and the nuclear accident in the Soviet Union is more likely than not to make them increase. Ingvar Carlsson himself believes that the political honeymoon ended with the blowout in Chernobyl.

The rough flirtation which Ingvar Carlsson and Birgitta Dahl have been having with the environmental organizations was halted at the very start. The SDP's credibility is very low in many people's eyes when it comes to the question of phasing out nuclear power. So the demands to close Barseback and Ringhals are also echoing in the air.

Other worries are piling up for Ingvar Carlsson as the end of the honeymoon begins to draw near. Chief among those worries is the conflict over the wage agreement for professional employees.

In that case, the State Employers Board has taken the unique step of locking out 40,000 teachers who are off duty for the summer, the reason being that the doctors [as published, possibly teachers intended] threatened to strike, and now negotiations covering 600,000 government employees have broken down.

That is a healthy and unusual move and one that is surely going to arouse anger. And the measure must have been sanctioned by Minister of Wages and Salaries Bengt K.A. Johansson.

In the April poll, the Center Party is still at 10 percent. Considering the big changes that have occurred in general following the events of this spring, that must be viewed as reflecting stabilization. Perhaps the nuclear accident will eventually provide a little extra dividend in the form of voters.

The interesting question is whether, despite everything, Karin Soder is more likely to lose than to gain. As prime minister, Ingvar Carlsson has issued far more invitations to cooperate than are helpful to a nonsocialist party.

Among nonsocialist voters in general, making agreements with the SDP has never been considered a recommendation. This was true in Gunnar Hedlund's time, it was true in Thorbjorn Falldin's time, and it is scarcely likely to be any less true for Karin Soder.

A new Social Democratic prime minister, regardless of how popular he may be, is scarcely likely to have brought about a quick change in deep-rooted patterns of behavior among nonsocialist voters.

The latest result of Carlsson's courting of the Center Party is an agreement concerning the new Planning and Construction Law, on which various governments have been working for two decades.

The Planning and Construction Law regulates the right of property owners to use and rebuild on their land. It is very uncertain whether the Center Party can derive any party-political satisfaction from that agreement.

The revisions as negotiated have not clarified a very complicated law that only experts can understand. In the last election campaign, the Center Party was never able to explain the Dagmar agreement on medical care. It appears that explaining the Planning and Construction Law is going to be an even more impossible task.

It is so much simpler for the Conservatives to say that the Center Party's agreement with the SDP means that it has gone along with a far-reaching scheme to socialize land than to try to explain the meaning of a number of difficult articles in the law.

The SDP and the Center Party have many obvious points of agreement on the radio and TV issue. Advertising within the framework of the current radio monopoly is the Center Party's policy. That is also the only solution that the SDP can consider accepting. The Center Party is therefore back in conflict with the other nonsocialist parties.

Lastly, the SDP is stretching out its hand ever more eagerly with a view to reaching a red-green agreement on the 1987 defense decision. Such an agreement will have to involve some degree of increase in the defense budget to pay for the production of Swedish missiles for the JAS aircraft, but under no circumstances will that increase be high enough to satisfy the Conservative Party's demands for more submarines and aircraft.

When Karin Soder agreed to be a candidate for party chairwoman, she emphasized that the Center Party wanted to work for the setting up of a three-party nonsocialist government in 1988. The party's committee of inquiry had expressed strong support for that objective.

Events this spring and Ingvar Carlsson's siren calls have revealed the Center Party's dilemma following four election defeats in a row. Too many red-green agreements with an SDP which is willing to cooperate and is also at the top of the voter barometer can easily cause the Center Party to lose its credibility as a nonsocialist government party. Nonsocialist voters are not likely to

appreciate such uncertainty, no matter how much they talk about the need for broad political agreements.

#### Voter Opinion

	Apr 1986	Feb 1986	Nov 1985	Apr 1983	Long-term Trend April 1986
Number of interviews	887	933	917	939	
Percentage with a party preference:					
SDP	46.0	38.0	43.0	45.0	42.6
Conservatives	17.5	16.5	19.0	28.0	22.4
Center Party	10.0	9.5	9.0	12.5	11.0
Liberal Party	19.0	24.0	21.0	4.0	13.1
VPK	4.0	6.5	4.5	4.0	5.0
KDS	1.0	2.0	1.5	2.5	2.4
Environment Party	2.5	3.0	2.0	3.0	3.2
Other	0.0	0.5	0.0	1.0	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Unable or unwilling to state "best party"	3.5	4.5	4.0	4.0	

The interviews were conducted during the period from 7 to 30 April 1986.

The Social Democrats show a very strong rise since February, while the Liberal Party and the VPK register declines that are statistically reliable in both cases. Otherwise, there were no changes in comparison with the previous poll.

Changes between two successive polls should be interpreted with great caution if it is not indicated that they are statistically significant. Instead, one should pay attention to trends over the period covered by the three latest polls or to differences with respect to the long-term trend.

For an individual poll, the statistical margin of error is as follows: SDP: about 3.3 percent; Liberal Party and Conservatives: about 2.5 percent; Center Party: about 1.9 percent; and all other parties: from 0.7 to 1.5 percent.

The long-term trend is calculated as a moving average for the seven most recent polls.

The surveys were conducted using a nationally representative probability sampling of Swedish citizens between the ages of 18 and 74. The interviews were conducted during home visits. The question asked was this: "Which party do you think is best?" Preferences were expressed using "ballots" and "ballot envelopes."

[The poll results are] COPYRIGHT: DAGENS NYHETER and the IMU.



Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 May 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Rallying Around Carlsson"]

[Text] The first IMU poll since Olof Palme's assassination shows a strong shift in the SDP's favor. Among those polled, confidence in the government was also up dramatically: three out of four voters seem tolerably satisfied with Ingvar Carlsson's government. The change of attitude toward the government occurred primarily among voters supporting the opposition parties, of course, but only the Liberals and the VPK actually lost sympathizers. The Conservative and Center Parties kept the positions they had occupied last winter but have not made up for their losses.

No clear political pattern can really be discerned in the changes: the SDP picked up supporters from both the "Right" and the "Left." The Liberal Party has many fickle voters following its success in the election, and it is not out of the question that some of them shifted to other nonsocialist parties which, in turn, may have lost supporters to the Social Democrats following the assassination. The fact that the VPK also lost support indicates that the rallying around the government was strongly felt in that quarter as well, since the explanation cannot be that Ingvar Carlsson has pushed policy in a more socialist direction.

The SDP's success occurred on a broad front, but it was somewhat greater among women, older people, and salaried employees and in the population centers. The Liberal Party's losses were distributed in approximately the same way, but were heavier among middle-aged voters and were markedly pronounced among members of the TCO [Central Organization of Salaried Employees]. The VPK also lost sympathizers in all categories, but chiefly among members of SACO/SR [Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees-National Federation of Government Employees]. It is a little surprising that younger voters were not more mobile this time.

Since the Social Democrats have long found it difficult to maintain their position in the big cities and among women, successes in those areas must be welcome even if they may be only temporary. The struggle for salaried employees will presumably get tougher as the SDP comes more and more obviously to view the Liberal Party as its chief opponent in the runup to the next election. The Liberal Party's probable reaction will be to gradually sharpen its tone with reference to the government. But that must happen slowly enough that public opinion, now so favorable to the government, can keep up with it.

Interrupting the political calm without being conspicuous as a troublemaker is currently the most difficult task facing the opposition parties. But the IMU poll was conducted before the nuclear accident in Chernobyl, which may stir up public opinion in the same way that the accident in Harrisburg did.

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CSO: 3650/223

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SYMPOSIUM DISCUSSES SOVIET SECURITY GOALS IN NORDIC AREA

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 25 May 86 p 10

[Article by Larserik Haggman; first four paragraphs are HUFVUDSTADSBLADET introduction]

[Text] The Nordic Committee for Eastern Country Research, in cooperation with the Institute of Political Science at Lund University, sponsored a symposium on 9 and 10 May on the topic "The Soviet Union and the Nordic Region: the Security Dimension."

The committee has been in existence for 10 years, is aided financially by the Nordic Council of Ministers, and devotes itself chiefly to publishing the NORDIC JOURNAL OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES and organizing symposiums of various kinds.

Participating in the activity were various types of researchers ranging from Slavic experts to jurists and from political scientists to cultural historians.

HUFVUDSTADSBLADET's Larserik Haggman, who attended the symposium in Lund, here gathers up some of the opinions expressed there.

The Swedish Submarine Commission made things easy for itself and presented a convenient explanation for the submarine sightings, claimed Steve Lindberg of Turku University in his speech at the Nordic security symposium in Lund some time ago.

Lindberg felt that the commission had brought the entire problem into the open, "encapsulated" it in such a way that Sweden could do something about it, and ignored the foreign policy aspect.

Lindberg claimed: "The Soviet Union has every reason to be pleased with the result and with Swedish policy."

According to him, Soviet defense will benefit if Sweden improves its antisubmarine capability. Lindberg also felt that the political danger of Sweden's becoming involved with NATO was small.

"Swedish authorities have been under strong pressure to reassure people that Sweden's policy remains firm and 'compelled' to adopt a low profile," Lindberg said, and he stressed that the Soviet Union had lost nothing but had made Sweden more attentive.

Saying that the submarine incidents fit in well with a larger security situation, he drew a cautious parallel with Finland's "note crisis."

#### American Offensive

The Murmansk region and the buildup of the Soviet fleet were seen by Lindberg as part of a global strategy on the Soviet side, while in his view, Norway's countermeasures, combined with the new U.S. naval strategy for the Soviet Union, should be seen as offensive measures.

"The point of the whole thing was that the Americans were pushing resources northward from Central Europe, with the result that the Soviet Union's advantage under the status quo had become uncertain.

"A note would not have been appropriate in the neighborly climate, and pressures on Norway would have produced the opposite effect," said Lindberg, and he drew attention to the submarine accident in Karlskrona.

That accident helped solve the signaling problem, he maintained, and what happened next was important in that it showed the United States what the Soviet Union thought without harming either NATO or Finland.

Lindberg summed up his speech by saying: "Along with the signal to the United States, there was also a signal to Sweden, and the result was greater attentiveness on Sweden's part, all to the benefit of the Soviet Union."

#### Military Dimension

Lindberg was both supported and opposed by Wilhelm Agrell of Lund University, who recently published a book on the submarine incidents.

"On the whole, the Soviet Union has clearly won from the normalization," he said, but unlike Lindberg, he emphasized the military dimension.

"The intrusions are a strategic phenomenon with a far-reaching political effect," said Agrell, citing a need for normalization and a dilemma with respect to credibility.

According to Agrell, it is typical of the big powers to "play ball with neutrality and credibility."

He also sketched a short history of the incidents and said that scattered submarine intrusions had occurred throughout the postwar period but that their character had changed quite decisively between 1977 and 1979, when the isobath of 20 meters was passed.



"It was a long time before the Swedish Navy reacted to what had been described at first as erroneous data," said Agrell, and he claimed that the Karlskrona incident had opened the Navy's eyes and made it take its data seriously.

#### Unintended Discovery

In obvious contrast to Lindberg, Agrell believed that it was never intended that the intrusions should be discovered. "They were never provocative in character," he maintained, and he warned against "overexplanation."

"It was simply that submarines were around like cockroaches, and when we lifted the lid, there they were," said Agrell.

#### Soviet Interests Both Global and Regional

Soviet reasoning and Soviet texts and statements are arguments that should be taken seriously. They are not propaganda but real policy that the Soviets believe in, said Danish researcher Bent Jensen.

He claimed that too much Western study concerning the Soviet Union and Soviet policy tries to interpret what is said as meaning something other than what it actually says.

Jensen reviewed briefly the question of whether the Soviet Union is interested in maintaining the status quo or engaging in power politics in relation to the Nordic Region. He rejected arguments that the Eastern superpower is paranoid about security or that Norway's or Denmark's departure from NATO might lead to greater U.S. or West German influence as being speculative Scandinavian talk, and he discussed the views of a number of researchers and writers:

"Orjan Berner views the Soviet Union as a classic big power, feels that Norwegian and Danish membership in NATO was already accepted by Stalin, and does not believe that the submarine incidents are a manifestation of political pressure being exerted on Sweden.

"Thomas Ries sees the Soviet Union as being interested in maintaining the situation as it is but also in advancing its interests marginally if the opportunity exists. According to him, the Soviet Union is saying unofficially that it wants to isolate the Nordic Region from West Europe.

"Katarina Brodin believes that the cost to the Soviet Union of moving its positions forward will be so great that it will abandon the idea.

#### Maintaining Status Quo

"Arne Olav Brundtland feels that the criticism of Norway and Denmark is aimed not at neutrality for those countries but at preservation of the status quo.

"Jan-Otto Johansen criticizes Berner for using 'People's Home logic,' believes that membership in NATO is accepted as a fact, and believes that Soviet policy is determined by history and geography.

"Mary Dau does not believe that the Soviet Union is really interested in a Nordic nuclear-free zone or the dissolution of NATO, and she wonders what Soviet policy would be if those things became reality.

"Osmo Jussila and all the Finnish researchers adopt the general view that the Soviet Union's interests are entirely defensive in character."

Following that enumeration, Jensen entered into polemics based on his thesis that the Soviet Union should be taken at its word.

### Changing Objectives

Jensen said: "The Soviet Union means what it says—that is confirmed by confidential discussions. It believes in the process of world revolution and therefore does not support any status quo."

According to Jensen, the USSR is aiming at changes but is showing clear restraint without changing its goal. In the Nordic Region, Finland was number one, said Jensen, and he emphasized in particular the reservation against neutrality where war and peace are concerned.

He then went on to Lev Voronkov's urging of the Nordic Region to change sides and discussed matters relating to methodology.

"The Soviet Union's know-how has improved, and its methods have become more sophisticated, but it seems to assume that NATO membership by Norway and Denmark was a mistake that occurred under imperialist pressure," said Jensen.

### Odd Split

According to Jensen, the Nordic Region is viewed in the Soviet Union as a unit which is oddly split—a situation that has existed for 40 years.

Unlike Jensen, Swedish researcher Ola Tunander argued that the Soviet Union was acting on behalf of Nordic balance.

Tunander said: "For example, Voronkov has emphasized that the confrontation between the blocs has brought Sweden closer to Finland, but the submarines are ambiguous. They may be offensive or defensive, but the way is open to beat a retreat, regardless of signaling intentions."

According to Tunander, it can never be in the Soviet Union's interest to have a confrontation in Nordic areas. Tunander viewed the geopolitical situation as a paradox that would require both Soviet pressure and low tension.

### Kola Peninsula Protection for Nordic Region

He said: "The Kola Peninsula's importance to the Soviet Union means definite protection for the Nordic Region," and he pointed out that the United States has achieved "escalation dominance" in the area and relieved the pressure on Central Europe, whereas the Soviet Union does not want escalation.

Tunander's conclusion was that the Nordic Region was characterized by an offensive American strategy combined with restrained Soviet expansionism.

He saw several possibilities in that situation, which should be met with restraint but without yielding.

"One possibility would be to have West European (instead of American) forces deployed here between the Soviet Union and the United States.

"That might bind the Nordic Region too closely to Central Europe, but it might also give Norway bargaining power with the United States," said Tunander.

#### Protective Buffer Zone

In assessing the Soviet Union's interests in the Nordic Region, Kristian Gerner of Lund University tried to differentiate between a global strategic dimension and the aspect of regional hegemony.

The global aspect leads to the need for air supremacy over the Norwegian coast, said Gerner, and the path to that coast leads over Finland and Sweden.

"From the regional angle, the Soviet Union seems to feel that Russian security is best safeguarded by a protective buffer zone," said Gerner, and he noted three variations of offensive Russian security policy: direct incorporation, an economic, military, and political alliance, and the forcing of "positive neutrality" on a neighboring state.

After reviewing developments in East Europe and the "Soviet Union's penetration of a number of countries," he drew the conclusion that at present, almost any kind of economic system in an adjacent state is acceptable provided that military and security conditions are met.

Applying what he knew of East Europe to the Nordic Region, Gerner drew the conclusion that "if the Soviet leaders are rational, they will increase their influence in the Nordic Region by military, diplomatic, and political means, not by economic and ideological means."

#### Possible To Influence Soviet Policy

Gerner also examined the question of whether it is possible to influence Soviet policy and used two examples to support his affirmative answer.

"Finland escaped sharing the fate of the Baltic states through strong military resistance, the price being a treaty which provides a measure of Soviet ascendancy but which also constitutes an argument against further influence.

"Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan show the opposite. It is possible to attract expansionism," said Gerner.

His conclusions, primarily with respect to the Nordic Region, were that Soviet policy can be modified through strong resistance. "What was true for Finland



in the 1940's should be true for Sweden and Norway in the 1980's when it comes to delimiting frontiers in the Barents Sea and the Baltic Sea."

He urged the governments of Sweden and Norway to seek support from the United States, NATO, and, for example, Japan in turning the Soviet Union's global commitment against Moscow as a political weapon on the regional level.

#### Security Dilemma

Gerner said: "Globally, the Soviet Union needs access to the world's oceans, but a policy aimed at satisfying that need increases the threat picture in the Nordic Region, and that in turn may strengthen an arms buildup and a policy of alliances, thus obstructing the Soviet Union's security policy. The big question is how the Soviet leaders will resolve that dilemma."

#### Danish Straits Unrealistic Target

All talk of a linking up of the Soviet Union's Northern and Baltic Fleets was roundly dismissed in a speech by Svend Aage Christensen of Copenhagen. He also described a hypothetical Soviet offensive against the Danish straits in a war situation as unrealistic.

Christensen recently made a study of the naval situation in the southern Baltic Sea and was able to present results that stand in clear contrast to the usual views held in Scandinavia and even in Finland.

According to him, it is now possible to observe definite restraint on the Soviet side, despite reports and information to the contrary.

"It would be very easy to point to considerably greater possibilities," said Christensen, who also described NATO's buildup in the Baltic Sea as an example of defensive policy.

He started with the generally held view that in terms of navies and naval aviation, the balance of power between the Warsaw Pact and NATO stands in a ratio of three to one.

But when he then clarified the picture and reviewed various military forces, he came up with another picture.

"There is definite asymmetry when it comes to submarines, for example, but the submarines which the Warsaw Pact has in the Baltic Sea can only attack vessels which NATO has not deployed here," Christensen explained.

He also pointed out that air supremacy is held by NATO in the western parts of the southern Baltic Sea and by the Warsaw Pact in the east.

"NATO's missile submarines, combined with mine capability and aircraft, make a direct attack almost impossible. And it is equally impossible for NATO's missile submarines to go very far east."

### **Submarines Are Defensive**

**"The Soviet submarines could perhaps be seen as a defensive factor preventing NATO from deploying larger ships in the area," said Christensen.**

**In his study, he had found no indication that in a war situation, the Soviet Union would try to force a passage from the Baltic out into the Atlantic. And an amphibious operation is hardly likely in view of the present armament on both sides.**

**He explained: "Even though 40 percent of Soviet shipbuilding capacity is in the Baltic Sea, it is not at all obvious that there would be an attack on the Danish straits."**

**Christensen concluded by saying: "But naturally, everything depends on how long a war, if there is one, lasts. In specific situations, it is conceivable that such an operation would become meaningful."**

**11798**

**CSO: 3650/243**

MILITARY

DENMARK

PAPER CHARGES SDP MOVING AWAY FROM DEFENSE AGREEMENT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 10 Jun 86 p 14

[Editorial: "A Fool in the Party"]

[Text] It is very foolish to talk about compromise possibilities at the present time. That was how Anker Jorgensen sharply rejected party colleague Knud Dangaard's assertion that he was prepared to arrive at a defense compromise with the Socialist People's Party. The party chairman probably has more than one fool in his party, but now he has named one of them. And this fool is the party spokesman on defense policy at that. The Social Democrats must be used to Anker Jorgensen's spontaneous outbursts, but even so.

The Social Democrats have seized on the idea of what is called defensive defense and they are working on a concrete proposal. However this has not been approved yet and there is no agreement on it within the party. What troubles some Social Democrats is the prospect that the party will embrace a standpoint that it cannot win support for among the parties they have traditionally cooperated with on defense policy. Defense Minister Hans Engell's sharp reaction to the concrete content of a defensive defense should be regarded as a warning signal and it cannot fail to make an impression. If the Social Democrats cannot cooperate with the government parties on a new defense agreement they will put themselves in a situation that even an unimaginative person can see will lead them sooner or later to the point where a repudiation of NATO will be unavoidable. According to Social Democratic policy this inevitable rejection is in conflict with the party's basic position and there are Social Democrats who cannot conceive of sharing responsibility for such a development. Folketing member Knud Dangaard does not believe defensive defense will have this consequence and therefore he comes out with statements about wanting to compromise with the Socialist People's Party on defense. Then he could get his proposal approved--the Radicals are always glad to help him out--and defense would not be any obstacle for the government cooperation the Social Democrats would like to have. This would be a gift for the Socialist People's Party. It has always opposed Denmark's membership in the Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Since the government change the Social Democrats have moved step by step away from the position that through the years has provided a solid majority



in support of Denmark's defense and security policy. But just as there is a limit to what the government can accept as a basis for national policy, there must also be a limit for the Social Democrats. In reality this is the same limit as the one the government has set. The minute a decision jeopardizes Denmark's participation in NATO, the limit has been reached. They have come close several times, but so far both sides have been concerned with pointing out that the limit had not been exceeded. A defense policy agreement created by Social Democrats and members of the Socialist People's Party would represent going too far and a new Social Democratic government would be forced to pursue a policy that means withdrawing from NATO. Anker Jorgensen is obviously aware of that risk. Otherwise it is unlikely that he would think of calling Knud Daaugard a fool.

6578

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21 July 1986

MILITARY

DENMARK

## CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY DRAFTING PLAN WITH GAS MASKS FOR ALL

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Jun 86 p 7

[Article by Jesper P. Jespersen]

[Text] An entirely new preparedness plan will be worked out to counter the effects especially of chemical weapons. It will comprise gas masks and gas jackets for the entire population. It will cost 1.1 billion kroner, a new report from the Civil Defense Board says.

Gas masks and gas jackets for the entire population. These are the recommendations contained in an entirely new report from the Civil Defense Board on the effects of chemical war substances and nuclear arms. The working group behind the report does not want to take a position on who will have to pay for it but states that if the state is to pay for it, the bill will come to approximately 1.1 billion kroner.

In a report of 145 pages, ordered by the Ministry of the Interior 3 years ago, the working group, moreover, writes that supplementary as well as existing shelters will have to be equipped with gas-proof steel doors, ventilating equipment, etc. If the state has to pay for it, it will cost at least 363 million kroner.

Not a single preparedness plan today provides for protection against the effects of chemical weapons, although it is recognized that the use of chemical war substances in the early stages of a situation of war cannot be ruled out.

The object of the report, therefore, is to recommend that the authorities involved improve the preparedness both against nuclear and chemical weapons. In this context, it is pointed out that the police today do not have such preparedness, and it is, therefore, recommended to start thorough training in that area.

Among the concrete proposals for a better preparedness plan is the preparation of a new "pamphlet for the population," which will simply deal with the issue of surviving a nuclear or chemical war. Laboratories will be established to find out quickly and safely what chemical substances will be used in an attack. Special radio and TV broadcasts will be prepared, and the operation of all of the power plants and administrative centers will be ensured.

To implement a number of concrete proposals, approximately 135 million kroner will have to be provided, and this does not include the costs of gas masks and gas jackets. Among the proposals which do not cost anything initially, the working group behind the report recommends as one of the most important things that rules and regulations be worked out how to deal with drinking water and foodstuffs that have become polluted in a war situation.

7262

CSO: 3613/153



MILITARY

DENMARK

## TWO SHIPBUILDERS IN COMPETITION FOR FISHERIES PATROL SHIPS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Jun 86 Sect III p 1

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard]

[Text] The Navy will be provided with two new and major fisheries patrol ships. Ten Danish shipbuilders will compete for the order, which is for a minimum of 620 million kroner.

The Materiel Command of the Navy has now reached the state in its plans for modernization of the fisheries patrol ships off Greenland that it has invited tenders from ten Danish shipbuilders for the construction of, initially, two, possibly four, new large, modern vessels.

The shipbuilders concerned are Ørskov Christensen's Steel Shipyard, Frederikshavn, Frederikshavn Shipyard, Aalborg Shipyard, Naskov Shipyard, Odense Steel Shipyard, Svendborg Shipyard, Dannebrog Shipyard, Burmeister and Wain, Dwinger Marineconsult, Inc., and Knud E. Hansen Aps.

The fisheries patrol ships at present available to the Navy are, for one thing, rather old, for the other, too small to meet the requirements made of fisheries patrol ships in the Greenland waters following the extension of the territorial waters to 200 nautical miles.

The draft design for the new ships has been prepared by the Scottish ship design company of Yard in Glasgow.

The new ships, which will cost a minimum amount of 310 million kroner each, will be 115 meters long. They will have a displacement of 2,400 tons and a service speed of 22 knots. The aim is for them to be able to remain at sea for 3 weeks at a time, subject to a certain safety margin. The higher rate of speed will be of great significance, partly when it is a question of catching up with a trawler which has entered the territorial waters, partly in emergency situations where it is a question of obtaining help quickly.

Considerably greater demands will be made of the new ships than has been the case with the old ones. The living quarters, among other things, will become more comfortable. In the nineties, one cannot offer crews sleeping quarters for 16 people.

Part of the ship's functions will, furthermore, become containerized. That is to say that a marine biology laboratory or a suite for the prime minister may, for example, be arranged in a container which fits into the hull of the ship. The ship will be moderately armed.



This is how BERLINGSKE TIDENDE's illustrator Peer Lauritzen visualizes the new fisheries patrol ships on the basis of the outline of the Scottish design firm of Yard.

MILITARY

FINLAND

## INCREASED CONCERN FOR CIVIL DEFENSE FOLLOWING CHERNOBYL

### Downtown Helsinki Lacks Shelters

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 31 May 86 p 3

[Article: "If Crisis Takes Helsinki by Surprise During Day, Large Part of People Downtown Would Remain Outside Shelters"; first paragraph is boldfaced lead-in in original]

[Text] In an emergency, only two-thirds of the human mass which throngs Helsinki in the daytime would be accommodated in the city's bomb shelters. At night there are more than enough bomb shelters to meet the residents' needs, but during the day a large part of those who just work or run errands in Helsinki would be left pounding on the doors of bomb shelters filled to capacity.

An attitude of utter indifference toward civil defense is assumed, however, in the ordinary apartment buildings where a majority of the city's bomb shelters are located. Most of the building associations lack the necessary equipment and protection plans prescribed by law. Yet it does not just boil down to the willingness of a stockholders' meeting to set the matter to rights.

"Altogether, the shelters in Helsinki can accommodate roughly 536,000 persons. At night, in other words, there is room for 10 percent more than the number of residents," says Goran Ahman, chairman of Helsinki's Civil Defense Board.

Some of the "extra places," to be sure, would be filled by students who are not counted as residents unless they are registered in the city.

"On the other hand, there is only enough room for 67 percent of the people who, it is estimated, are in Helsinki during the daytime," says Ahman.

The overwhelming majority of the city's bomb-shelter accommodations are in so-called building shelters, in other words, apartment buildings and business buildings. There are accommodations for only about 118,000 persons in the large rock shelters, 14,000 of them in the metro stations.

### Big Differences From One Area to Next

The differences in opportunities to find shelter are entirely too big from one area to the next, according to Ahman. He feels that the areas with small



houses are in the weakest position. After all, shelters do not have to be built in privately owned homes, and generally speaking there are no rock shelters in such areas.

Of the dozen or so new rock shelters planned for Helsinki, those in Itakeskus, Roihupelto, Maunula, Kampi, and Pohjois-Mellunmaki have been given preference.

#### **Shelters in Buildings Poorly Maintained**

The very first thing Goran Ahman would do, however, is start patching up the faulty bomb shelters in buildings.

"The excessive number of poorly maintained shelters in buildings is a major problem. Each building association should have a protection plan and, according to law, specific shelter equipment such as a water tank, chemical toilet, ax, pails, and so forth. But the building associations have not really understood this obligation," confirmed Ahman.

The bomb-shelter inspectors in Helsinki are constantly making their rounds and checking out the shelters in buildings. When approximately 1,400 building shelters were inspected last April, it came to light that two-thirds of the building associations lacked the protection plan prescribed by law, and easily one-half of them lacked equipment.

Ahman points out that four-fifths of Helsinki's shelter accommodations are in building shelters. In spite of this, the building associations have been lulled into an exaggerated feeling of security, and they do not assume a sufficiently serious attitude toward civil defense. It takes an accident like the one in Chernobyl to shake people up and get them to think about civil defense.

"The condition of the bomb shelter is dependent on each building owner or on the resolve of the stockholders' meeting," affirms Ahman.

In the acquisition of the requisite bomb-shelter material, for example, it cannot be a question of money, because the price of the material package varies between 8,000 and 15,000 markkas, depending on the size and qualitative standard of the building.

#### **Communist Paper Discusses Capability**

Helsinki KANSAN UUTiset in Finnish 31 May 86 pp 8-10

[Article by Jukka Parkkari: "Chernobyl Awakens Interest in Country's Civil Defense"; first two paragraphs are boldfaced lead-in in original]

[Text] The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant has stirred a considerable debate in Finland about this country's civil defense.

The conclusion could even be drawn from certain newspaper articles that at least a few former opponents of civil defense have now begun to call Finland's civil defense inadequate and too inefficient.

The current debate on civil defense shows that people are willing to change their minds quickly if they feel themselves threatened. Actually there are no new studies yet available about the effects of Chernobyl on people's attitudes toward civil defense, but it is expected that civil defense has indeed picked up some new supporters.

It should be kept in mind, however, that the nuclear power accident which occurred in the Soviet Union more than a month ago did not introduce into Finland enough radiation to justify, even remotely, actual civil-defense measures, unless the recommendations to avoid using rainwater are considered such.

#### Level of Finnish Civil Defense

At what level is Finland's civil defense on an international scale? According to the parliamentary Civil Defense Committee which submitted its report in 1983, the following amount of money was spent annually per person on civil defense in certain countries:

Switzerland 140 markkas; Sweden 90; Norway and Denmark 40; the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France 20; England 10; and the United States 3.

Finland was not included outright in this grossly simplified comparison, but it was confirmed that the total yearly outlay for civil defense was approximately the same as in Norway.

The situation can be illustrated by stating that in Switzerland there is room in a shelter for practically everyone, in Finland for half the population, and in England for no one.

#### Pictured Threat: Bombings

But the amount of money spent does not say everything about the efficiency of civil defense. The key issue is what kind of threat the civil defense was developed to counter.

The Finnish Civil Defense Law in effect at this very moment was enacted in 1958. World War II's massive terror bombings, which were directed mainly at cities, then loomed large. For example, the conventional bombs dropped on Dresden killed many more people than the atomic bomb did in Hiroshima.

Evacuation, or the transfer of people away from probable bombing targets, and the construction of bomb shelters for those who could not be sent to inner Finland became the fundamental ideas of Finnish civil defense.

In 1959 the country was divided into two parts by the civil defense decree: civil defense centers and a surveillance area. In the civil defense centers, the construction of bomb shelters was ordered in buildings of more than 3,000 cubic meters. There was no obligation to construct shelters in the surveillance area.








Many foreign experts have been surprised by the relatively high level of Finland's civil defense. In the picture: a practice drill at headquarters deep under Tahtitorninmaki.





During times of so-called profound peace, some of the bomb shelters are put to other use, like this Helsinki shelter which serves as a place for parking cars.

For the so-called surveillance area, the Civil Defense Committee suggested shelter solutions which would also be helpful in the event of unexpected nuclear contaminant fallout.



## **Pictured Threat Expands**

Progress in weapons technology soon led to expansion of the pictured threat, however. In 1967 the Defense Council stated, among other things:

"...the starting point for civil defense preparations must be that possible military operations against us will be carried out primarily with conventional weapons. Nevertheless, we must guard against radioactive fallout that comes from outside the republic and against damage caused by nuclear missiles gone astray. We must also take into account chemical and biological weapons."

Expansion of the pictured threat led, among other things, to the examination and correction of evacuation schemes and of building codes for bomb shelters and to the construction of a radiation surveillance network.

The large-scale nuclear tests performed in the atmosphere at the start of the 1960s--tests which brought to Lapland radioactive fallout whose aftereffects are being studied this very day--had an enormous impact on the matters at hand.

The parliamentary Civil Defense Committee also focused considerable attention on peacetime disasters the consequences of which could require civil-defense measures. Included among them--in addition to nuclear power mishaps--were various accidents in connection with gas transport and even a satellite's fall from the sky. During the time the committee toiled, there was fear that a satellite equipped with a nuclear battery could cause damage when it plunged to earth.

## **Hundreds of Gauges**

Outside the Soviet Union, the nuclear contaminants from Chernobyl were first measured in Finland, as far as we know. The measurement was performed at the Defense Forces' measurement station. Finland's radiation surveillance network is considered highly efficient on an international scale, although the strike by civil servants impaired its operation to some degree. The activity of the surveillance is described in the aforementioned committee report as follows:

"In the observation networks of the Defense Forces and the Interior Affairs Ministry, there are roughly 230 stations ready for action which are outfitted with a radiation surveillance gauge and a general device for measuring radiation. In normal times, approximately 30 stations have continuous measurements and recordings as well as light and sound indicators by which you are informed if the dosage rate rises 5 to 10 times that of normal background radiation."

All the stations will be in operation, naturally, when their capability is improved. Furthermore, in exceptional circumstances, the number of radiation surveillance stations will be increased to about 500, and on top of that 2,000 radiation surveillance posts will be formed. Preparations have also been made for the use of mobile radiation-reconnaissance patrols.

## Bomb Shelters Too Good

In principle, therefore, there is enough of the necessary measuring equipment, but its expanded use around the clock 7 days a week would, of course, cost a considerable sum. According to some appraisals, there should also be more gauges with which very small amounts of radiation could be measured.

But would the current bomb shelters be useful if a heavy cloud of nuclear contaminants threatened Finnish territory? Of course they would, but as a matter of fact the Finnish bomb shelters are too good for protecting against mere contaminants; they were built to protect against war.

For example, the strongest Finnish shelters will withstand a 100-kiloton nuclear bomb in a so-called ground zero explosion, or directly on top of the shelter. In shelters of this quality, naturally, there are also good filters for keeping out contaminants.

The shelters in buildings offer excellent protection against contaminants, provided, of course, that their facilities are in good working order.

But there are shelters only in the civil defense centers. One and a half million Finns live in areas where in practice there are no bomb shelters, not even against contaminant fallout.

There are shelterless areas in the cities, too. These are areas with small or old houses which were built before the obligations of the Civil Defense Law went into effect. It is true the Civil Defense Law implies that the municipalities should construct general bomb shelters for these areas as well, but it has not happened that way everywhere.

In a peacetime nuclear-power accident, however, effective rescue-service arrangements and speedy communications are more important than shelters. In this respect, at least, there may still be room for improvement in Finland.

## Amendment to Law Drawn Up

The Civil Defense Committee proposed in its report the construction of light shelters in parts of the so-called surveillance area or--for all practical purposes--the countryside. An amendment to the Civil Defense Law was drawn up long ago by the Interior Affairs Ministry, but it has not yet been up for discussion in the Parliament.

It will be interesting to see how Chernobyl has affected the attitude of parliamentary representatives toward civil defense. We will find out when the Parliament is forced to take a stand on the aforementioned law amendment.

[Box, page 9]

There are 101 civil defense centers in Finland. The State Council has designated 101 municipalities or parts of municipalities as civil defense centers where bomb



shelters must be made in buildings of more than 3,000 cubic meters. Roughly 3 million people, or 65 percent of the country's population, live in areas with civil defense centers.

#### Helsinki Improving Alarm System

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Jun 86 p 13

[Article: "Helsinki Modernizes Its Alarm System; Chernobyl Accident Speeded Up Decision"]

[Text] Helsinki will update the equipment of its alarm system by the end of next year. According to the city government office, the Chernobyl accident has speeded up the long-planned decision.

In the current system there are numerous electrical sirens more than 40 years old and a dozen or so high-efficiency pneumatic alarms. Despite constant maintenance, the system has been declared unreliable.

In order for the alarms to be audible in the future throughout the entire populated section of the city, the plan is to modernize all the high-efficiency alarms. Reliability will soon be improved by acquiring an alarm-control arrangement that meets current demands.

In making plans for the new system, attention is being paid to forecasts for the city's growth. The Civil Defense Board points out in its decision, however, that 100-percent certainty cannot be achieved.

Modernization will begin at the end of this summer in the large eastern district by changing the high-efficiency alarms in Vuosaari and Vartiokyla. After this, the process will continue district by district until all the high-efficiency alarms have been changed by the end of next year.

The electrical sirens will be eliminated from use once the new high-efficiency alarms are in working order. At the same time, there will be a switchover from siren-type alarms to horn-type alarms. The latter can be heard over a broader area.

In order to avoid critical situations, there are also plans for acquiring mobile alarms capable of reproducing speech.

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CSO: 3617/125

MILITARY

GREECE

## STEYR FIRM PERILOUSLY CLOSE TO CLOSING

### Workers Protest

Athens ETHNOS In Greek 24 May 86 p 15

/Article by Dimitri Kalantzi: "Leonidas Will Save Steyr" /

/Text / The Leonidas tank, which totally meets the needs of the Greek Army and which is superior to ones by foreign multinationals is, together with the shift in covering the needs of public enterprises, urban communications, etc., the solution which will save the Steyr Elias firm.

This proposal is made by the working people in a memorandum they submitted to all appropriate authorities and which they also brought to Kastri /the premier's residence / so Andreas Papandreou himself could know about it.

Steyr Elias, which was hellenized during 1982-83, has modern installations at Sindos of Thessaloniki and employs 910 persons. It was established in 1972 in cooperation with the Austrian Steyr Puch and in 1983 its net profits reached 1 billion drachmas. In 1984, its profits dropped to 26 million drachmas and subsequently it began facing economic problems.

As the memorandum of the working people points out, it is "a company furnished with modern technological equipment and is a model for existing Greek industry."

### The Products

The products the company produces are: various types of tractors and farm machinery; military trucks of various types; trash collection trucks, tank trucks, etc.; fire-fighting trucks; urban and tourist buses; Leonidas-type personnel armored vehicles; military and civilian jeeps; motors, etc.

It is proposed that the working people should participate in the operation of the company and that the company should continue to produce the Leonidas-type tanks which, according to reports, are the ones procured by the Greek Army to cover its needs and which are superior to those offered by other multinational industries.

### The Committee

A committee should be established consisting of specialists from the Ministries to the Premier, National Economy, Industry, National Defense, Interior, Communications and Agriculture.

The function of this committee will be to evaluate the priorities of the Greek state's needs in all types of vehicles and always, of course, within the framework and activity sectors of the above ministries. For example, the Communications Ministry must meet the needs of urban transportation organizations, Olympic Airlines, the railroads' organization, etc. Also, the Agriculture Ministry must procure, through the Agricultural Bank, farm machinery for cooperatives, while the Interior Ministry must cover the needs of municipalities and communities, and the Ministry of Defense the need in tanks, jeeps, etc.

A study should be made for a long-term establishment of a National Auto Industry with Steyr Elias as its main body. An investigation should be made for pinpointing administrative and management mistakes and assigning any responsibilities.

Chairman, Director Resign

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 27 May 86 p 12

Text Steyr Elias Director Alexiou and Board Chairman Vogiatzoglou submitted their resignations which are related to the continued inactivity of the company in the production sector since it failed to manufacture the Leonidas tank and jeep vehicles for the Armed Forces.

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21 July 1986

MILITARY

PORTUGAL

**BUDGETARY, INTERNAL ISSUES AFFECT ARMED FORCES**

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 10 May 86 pp 1, 24

[Text] According to what a government source told EXPRESSO, Cavaco Silva is debating whether or not he should present a supplementary budget proposal to the Assembly of the Republic because of increased expenditures in the armed forces, the Public Security Police and the National Republican Guard, for gasoline which will now have to be purchased at civilian prices. The supplementary budget is believed to have been drawn up. However, it is possible that the Finance Ministry will give the armed forces, the police and the National Republican Guard the necessary funds from the 13.3 million conto provisional fund contained in the present budget for armed forces' "unforeseen and unpostponable expenses."

It should be noted that among certain circles, it is believed the government's decision to increase the armed forces' fuel supply came only after Lemos Ferreira's 25 April speech criticizing the decrease in the government's defense budget. The decision was definitely made on the 27th. Nevertheless, a government source assured us that the increase was the logical result of the state budget and was in no way connected with the armed forces chief of staff's speech. According to the same source, no one could simply see any reason to exclude the armed forces and the police forces from obligations imposed by the Assembly of the Republic on all government departments without exception.

EXPRESSO also learned that Cavaco Silva had no intention of reacting to the Lemos Ferreira speech in a way that would make him "an armed forces martyr."

As for the increase in the price of gasoline, it is provoking protests from the military hierarchy and general discontent in the armed forces.

**Military Still Loses 3 Million in Income**

According to a military source who asked to remain anonymous, it is not only the individual officers and sergeants who are losing a perquisite they have had for many years. It is the armed forces which must now pay PETROGAL for fuel at civilian price levels. According to our sources, the reaction of military personnel to the government's decision is based more on the strength of their feelings for the institution than for material or personal financial reasons. The same, however, is not the case for the armed forces leadership which, as a result of this action, will experience a significant loss of income that may not be offset by the supplementary budget.

According to the explanations we were given, the armed forces were buying gasoline at half price. This gasoline was not being bought to be used exclusively for official purposes. It was also being sold to military personnel and the military's civilian employees at a lower price per unit (presently it costs them 98 escudos per liter). We were also told that the difference between the purchase and selling price "amounted to about 3 million contos per year." This money was being put into a type of discretionary fund under the control of the individual commands and the chiefs of staff. The armed forces' leadership was then able to pay for some expenditures not completely covered by normal budget appropriations with this fund. Now, however, the military cannot count on this extraordinary income and it must also pay an additional tax that civilian consumers have been paying all along.

#### Six Hundred Liters per 100 Kilometers

A high level member of the military contacted by EXPRESSO told us that once this measure goes into effect "the armed forces will begin to have difficulty in overcoming this new government imposed situation. This government has already drastically restricted budget appropriations for this year."

He reminded us at this point that armored vehicles, for example, "consume 600 liters of fuel per 100 kilometers." This means that should there be an increase in the price of fuel, they would have to remain parked.

The government's decision comes at a time when the situation within the armed forces is not peaceful. Gen Lemos Ferreira's (for some brave and for others inadequate) speech at the 25 April commemorations, Gen Salazar Braga's letter to the chairman of the National Defense Committee of Parliament on the presence of foreign troops in Portugal, the controversial deal involving the purchase of frigates for the Portuguese Navy, a recent dispute among the Army chief of staff, the armed forces chief of staff and Admiral Sousa Leitao because the director of the Army's financial services was denied a promotion and Pezarat Correia was passed over for promotion from brigadier to general are all internally destabilizing factors.

Despite his seniority and the fact that he is considered by his colleagues and the leadership as "the most competent and best qualified," Pezarat has just been passed over for promotion to general by the Army's High Council and the Council of the Chiefs of Staff. Brigadiers Hugo dos Santos, director of transportation services, Morgado, aide-de-camp to Gen Salazar Braga, and Lucena, director of the Army's training department, were recommended for promotion. All these men are younger than Pezarat. It is now up to the National High Defense Council, presided by Mario Soares, to either rectify or ratify the Army command's recommendation.

#### Pezarat Considers the Reserves

When EXPRESSO contacted Brig Pezarat Correia, who now is chief of staff of the Army's operational command, he said that he is giving strong consideration to going into the reserves should he be passed over for promotion.

"At that time I will speak openly about this matter," he said. He also added that he will never accept remaining "on active duty under arbitrary conditions that have no professional merit."

MILITARY

PORTUGAL

# A-7 CORSAIR AIRCRAFT EFFICIENCY DOUBTED FOLLOWING ACCIDENT

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 29 May-5 Jun 86 p 18

[Article by A.D.]

[Excerpts] "Human failure..."

Once more the Portuguese Air Force defends the material aspect and discredits the pilots. The bone of contention is some secondhand planes purchased from the United States upon instructions from General Lemos Ferreira which frequently crash: the A-7P Corsairs. In the FAP's opinion, everything was attributable to a "senseless" controversy, "abuses" of freedom of the press and "impudent behavior" on the part of certain leftist deputies... Until one day when a Marinha Grande glass worker dies in her home, badly burned by the flaming fuel of a Corsair falling to earth.

The village of Pocarica, Macieira-Lis, near Leiria, will never forget the day when the customary tranquillity of the town was suddenly shattered by the collision of two planes which "were conducting war games."

## Reports Confirmed

In the FAP's opinion, was this just one more accident involving two A-7P Corsair planes? It is thus indicated in a rather cold manner in a communique sent by FAP's General Staff in which it is asserted that the two planes were approaching the base under "conditions of poor visibility" and once more suggesting that "human failure" was the cause of the disaster. But for the Portuguese Corsairs which Gen Lemos Ferreira, head of the Air Force General Staff at the time, purchased secondhand from the United States, nothing will be as before.

Now there is confirmation of the suspicions and denunciations of Cesar Oliveira (then deputy of the UEDS) and of Jose Lello, demagogue of the Socialist party, when, a little more than a year ago, they raised the question in Parliament in no uncertain terms: We had spent 50 million contos for the purchase of a genuine "white elephant" for the Portuguese Air Force and no one knew the terms of the deal or the condition of the planes.



## Onslaught by the FAP

The denunciations and contentions of the deputies, as well as news items belittling the Corsair "deal," were met by the Air Force General Staff with a flood of propaganda in the news media concerning the A-7's and with suits against the journalists of the TAL E QUAL and DIARIO DE LISBOA.

At a press conference in November 1984, Gen Lemos Ferreira defended the purchase of the Corsairs, pointing out that this plane continues to be used by the U.S. Armed Forces, particularly on aircraft carriers; perhaps this was an additional attempt to "prove" that the purchase was justified.

### O JORNAL Was Right...

But what actually happened? In May 1984, before FAP's offensive in the news media, O JORNAL--in an article signed by Cesario Borga--disclosed that of the first 20 A-7's which arrived in Portugal few succeeded in flying...

In fact, Portugal has continued to receive A-7P planes, secondhand, overhauled, but without stocks of spare parts. It did not take long for most of the planes to be put in storage in hangars at Monte Real Air Base.

But let us go back still further. In August 1982, O JOURNAL published an article under the interrogative title: "Fighter Planes of the FAP, Junk in the United States?" This made Gen Lemos Ferreira angry.

Only 6 months before, the country had received the first shipment of nine A-7P Corsair planes with pomp and circumstance: The event was televised with Defense Minister Freitas do Amaral at the controls.

### "Junk"

Briefly, the O JOURNAL article said that the Americans were replacing the "anti-quated" F-4 Phantoms and A-7 Corsairs with ultrasophisticated F-18 Hornets and that the U.S. pilots were not hesitating to apply the term, "junk," to the type of planes which had arrived in Portugal 6 months previously.

During the recent U.S. attack on Libya some A-7's were used, taking off from the America and Coral Sea aircraft carriers. The FAP leaders immediately attempted to suggest that our planes were also good, since they were also A-7's. However, the difference between our Corsairs and those used by the U.S. Navy is, more or less, the same as that between a Renault 5, 1974 model, and a Super 5 Turbo, 1986 model.

But there is still another difference: The Americans use the Corsairs as aircraft carrier planes; in Portugal they have become "land-based," being headquartered at Monte Real Air Base. Let us hope that they will not see more "water" service.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

**HANS VON HOFSTEN: COUNTRY'S MILITARY CREDIBILITY QUESTIONED**

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 8 Jun 86 p 3

[Op Ed Article by Commander Hans von Hofsten; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Are the skies of Swedish security policy clear when foreign naval forces continue to operate in Swedish territory year after year, when it has been established that a foreign power is probably planning to assassinate our fighter pilots, when the superpower on the opposite shore is converting its interceptor units to attack units, and when the prime minister has been assassinated? That question is asked by Commander Hans von Hofsten in a concluding contribution to DAGENS NYHETER'S debate on security policy.

Is Sweden secure? The debate has been a lively one for more than half a year now, especially on this page, but other newspapers have also opened their editorial and Op Ed pages to a discussion of our country's security policy in a way that is probably without parallel since the war years.

As always happens when a debate is being conducted without tight control, this one has had many facets, but even so, it has not run wild.

Looking for specific conclusions when faced with that horn of plenty is not easy, but in keeping with DAGENS NYHETER's practice, it is the duty of the one who begins a debate to make the attempt. In this article, therefore, I will state my interpretation of the debate and, at the same time, try to correct what I regard as misconceptions.

Officers have the right to participate in public debate concerning the country's security policy. This has been stated in unequivocal terms by the minister of defense, the attorney general, and the appointed supreme commander of the Armed Forces, with no limits being set.

The personal restriction that I have imposed on myself is that I will not express an opinion on our international diplomacy, since doing so might lead to misunderstandings abroad. Nor, as far as I have seen, has any other officer written anything in that respect.

Restraint and discernment in connection with security policy issues are highly valued among officers. When someone nevertheless begins to speak critically, he does so only after careful consideration. But many people seem to assume the opposite—that is, that the professional man is a notorious alarmist. For my part, I have become convinced that if officers do not contribute military insights concerning security policy issues to the debate, that debate simply limps along in many cases.

Many people have asked me—often in indignant terms—why our top military leaders do not express their views in the public debate. Only the leaders themselves can answer that question accurately. In my opinion, it would be almost indefensible for the OB [supreme commander of the Armed Forces] or the heads of the armed services to carry on a public controversy with their government. Besides, they have the opportunity to express their views in meetings with the politicians, and I assume that they do so.

There have been few overtones of domestic politics. It seems obvious to me, however, that the debate has been fueled mainly by the nonsocialists, while the Social Democrats have mostly commented on statements by others.

But there are some striking exceptions. S.O. Andersson points emphatically to the need for "the Social Democrats to analyze the situation following years of real cutbacks and very severe internal rationalization throughout the Armed Forces and to do so in a way that is and appears to be serious and realistic. Otherwise they are risking a credibility crisis, and that is very serious." He says: "The upshot, in my opinion, will be that there is objective justification for a defense decision that will clearly turn things around." Andersson then refers to another exception, namely, an editorial in TIDEN, where special emphasis was placed on the need to cope with the persistent peacetime intrusions so as to show both blocs that in a crisis, we not only can live up to our obligations as a neutral state but intend to do so.

Bror Perjus of the trade union movement gives a third example of a new approach by the Social Democrats in his article "Stop Playing With the Peace Doves." He calls for a realistic view of the military threat which he is convinced exists, saying that "increasingly strong public opinion favoring peace and struggling with increasingly effective methods can also very well be combined with a strong Swedish defense and a greater Swedish will to resist."

Brigadier General Einar Lyth wrote that the credibility of our ability to carry out our security policy has begun to waver abroad, among Swedes in general, and even among officers. A quick survey by TV news confirmed that Lyth's views are shared by an alarmingly large number of regimental and air wing commanders. He concluded his article by saying: "The 1987 defense decision will probably determine whether that wavering credibility is going to be overcome or turn into a credibility crisis, which in turn may lead to a crisis in security policy."

Concerning that wavering credibility, Sture Ericson, a member of Parliament and of the Defense Committee, says it is probably a threat we will have to live with. That statement betrays such an abysmal ignorance of all the basics



of leadership that one can only clap one's hand to one's forehead. It is precisely that kind of ostentatious nonchalance and indifference on the part of leading politicians which has a demoralizing effect on those responsible for putting decisions by the politicians into practice. In it we have one of the reasons why career men are deserting the Armed Forces.

Of the same nature is his assertion that Sweden has not been disarming over the past 15 years, but that the Armed Forces have received financial compensation in real terms. With that assertion, he is convincing neither foreign observers nor Swedish professionals. But he may be hoodwinking part of the public.

Freedom from alliances in peacetime aimed at neutrality in wartime—the basic idea in our security policy—has not been challenged by any debater as long as we are prepared to pay its price. That is good, and it calls for no comment other than the main question: are we prepared to pay the price?

Interservice disputes have been quite conspicuous by their absence. Everyone seems convinced of the need for a balanced defense with no obvious gaps. The unfortunate thing is that we have such gaps.

In the Navy, despite the greatest strain on "all available resources" since the war, we have not overcome the submarine threat after 5 years of effort. And a reasonable prospect of success sometime in the 1990's is provided only at the highest appropriation level: the OB level. In that connection, warning voices have been heard saying that we must be careful not to promote antisubmarine operations at the expense of anti-invasion defense. Of course! But those misgivings are based on a regrettable misconception. The fact is that, paradoxically enough, the main mission of all the expensive components of an antisubmarine force is precisely anti-invasion defense (against surface targets). Of the total cost of an entire force, only about one-sixth represents the additional cost of the antisubmarine function. Those circumstances provide an excellent illustration of the great flexibility of naval forces.

Can it be that misunderstanding which has prevented many people from realizing the advantages of submarines and coastal corvettes? They can be effectively used for quite different missions in peacetime, in wartime, and in the gray area in between. But no one in the Navy is saying that appropriations for the necessary reconstruction should be taken from other defense functions, only that the problem must be solved with fresh money.

The quality of many of the Army's units is now approaching such a low level that they are in danger of being slaughtered in a confrontation with the enemy's modern units. The Army needs to regenerate its field units, otherwise a very serious gap is going to appear there.

In the Air Force, no one has questioned quality so far. But it has been hit by the same heavy-handed reductions as the Navy. The halving of air defense is extremely alarming, especially in view of the fact that the Soviet Union

has multiplied the number of attack aircraft that can be sent against targets in Sweden from their peacetime bases in the Baltic states.

Surprise attacks have been a central concept in many contributions to the debate. Everyone, even the Defense Committee, seems to agree on the danger of such attacks. On the other hand, opinions are sharply divided on the question of what that concept involves. The Defense Committee talks about "attacks with little warning" preceded by a "prewar phase" which "may, under our planning assumptions, last for as long as a year and which may, in turn, be followed by a period of neutrality lasting several months or a period of war."

Nils Gylden, who is a security expert in the Ministry of Defense and a member of the Defense Committee, supported such an interpretation in his contribution to the debate. The Defense Committee's scenario reminds one strongly of the prelude to the outbreak of World War II. There is talk of a gradual worsening of the political situation that will give us time to take steps. What happened back then was that a number of smaller states caught in the field of tension between competing big powers were occupied. That was one stage in the efforts by the big powers to improve their starting positions in what they feared was a coming trial of strength. The countries which lay in the field of tension at that time are now incorporated into one or the other of the two blocs. Sweden has taken the place of those states. Today the field of tension runs straight through Scandinavia.

Military men are sometimes accused of planning for the last war. But when one studies the Defense Committee's scenario, one gets the impression that it is the politicians who are guilty of doing so.

It has been claimed both in Norway and in Finland that the undermining of Sweden's Armed Forces is the strongest destabilizing factor in Northern Europe. Submarine activity, the refitting of the air force in the Baltic states, and NATO's stockpiling in Norway show how the big powers are reacting to compensate for that imbalance. These developments mean that Sweden's security, and consequently its independence, are being increasingly determined by the big powers' measures and countermeasures rather than by our own.

I personally have drawn attention to the military possibility of a lightning attack carried out with brief or misinterpreted advance warning at a time when, for some reason, the other bloc's ability to act has been reduced and we ourselves are at an especially low level of preparedness.

Such a possibility can best be counteracted if we see to it that we can "grab the ball" using the resources actually at our disposal. Consequently, we should not concentrate solely on numbers and quality but also pay attention to preparedness.

It has been said in authoritative military quarters that "I definitely do not believe anything about a surprise attack hitting us like a bolt from the blue." As an axiom, that must be correct. But are the skies of our security policy really "blue"?

Are those skies clear when foreign naval forces operate in Swedish territory year after year?

Are they clear when the Armed Forces get embroiled in week-long operations involving service ammunition inside the Navy's bases and ports?

Are they clear when it has been established that a foreign power is probably planning to assassinate our fighter pilots?

Are they clear when the superpower on the opposite shore is converting its interceptor units to attack units?

Are they clear when foreign warplanes are repeatedly guilty of serious violations of our territory?

Are they clear when the prime minister has been assassinated?

What else has to happen before those skies are regarded as having clouded over? After all the unanimous talk about the Nordic region's sharply increased strategic importance, one need not be an alarmist to begin reflecting on Churchill's words about "The Gathering Storm."

So is Sweden secure? I am undecided, and the debate has not been able to provide a clear-cut answer to the question. That in itself ought to provide food for thought.

"A country does not lose its freedom when it values that above all else, but it loses prosperity and wealth as well when prosperity and wealth are valued above freedom" (W. Somerset Maugham).

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

## ENTIRE HARSFJARDEN TO BE BLOCKED WITH NETS TO HALT SUBS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 30 May 86 p 10

[Article by Lars Porne]

[Text] The chief of the navy is tired of visits by foreign submarines in Harsfjarden and has now begun to block off the entire waterway with permanent nets, even before the Water Rights Court gives its approval.

"The nets will inclose all of Harsfjarden," the chief of the Naval Staff's nautical division, Captain Hans von Hofsten told SVENSKA DAGBLADET.

An announcement in SVENSKA DAGBLADET reported that the work will take place and that the Water Rights Court will meet in Nynashamn on 13 June to determine whether or not permission will be granted.

The navy is in a hurry, however, and Stockholm's Coastal Artillery Defense District has already begun the work. It is estimated that the job will take 6 months.

The application to the court mentions a construction time of 5 years, however.

### Every Sound Closed

Every sound that leads into Harsfjarden will be closed off by the nets. There will be openings in the nets for commercial vessels, fishing boats, and recreational boats. These openings can be closed by lifting the net from the seabed.

The openings will be marked by buoys and red and green traffic lights will be used to regulate passage.

Capt von Hofsten said that cables would be stretched over the sound as the work proceeded.

### Necessary Information

The fact that the military authorities are coming out and announcing the beginning of this work may seem strange, considering the defense nature of the project. Capt von Hofsten explained:

"We feel obliged to make this public out of consideration to third parties. We cannot install obstacles that could damage those who pass by."

The nets will be marked with ordinary buoys and indicated on nautical charts.

#### Satellite Surveillance

"In addition, these barriers may be readily detected by satellite surveillance and I am sure that foreign powers have sufficient on-site surveillance," von Hofsten said.

"Instead of trying to keep this work secret, we want to let boaters know before the sailing season really gets underway. When there is rough weather, conditions at Mysingen can be extremely difficult and sailors prefer to pass through the protected waters of Harsfjarden. We want to cause as little damage as possible to navigation."

#### Landowner's Permission

The work has begun before the Water Rights Court has given its permission but, since the landowner, the municipality of Nynashamn, has given its permission the military authorities feel reassured.

The installation of this barrier system will make it impossible to enter Harsfjarden if the openings in the nets are closed. Under these same conditions, of course, it will be impossible to get out.

The naval chief has called on the Stockholm Coastal Artillery Defense District to apply to the county government for permission to conduct electronic surveillance at the work sites. It would then be prohibited for anyone to dive, fish, or otherwise come within 25 meters of the net on either side.



All of Harsfjorden will be blocked off with nets between islands and skerries. The barriers will be indicated on nautical charts. Traffic will be allowed through special openings in the nets.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

**PRIVATE GROUP DONATES MILLION KRONOR FOR ANTISUB MEASURES**

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 May 86 p 22

[Article: "Million From Aseda Against Subs"]

[Text] Women are our best defense, according to Nils Arvid Arvidsson of Aseda near Vetlanda. It was he who began collecting money to improve our antisubmarine defenses after the U 137 ran aground in Gasefjarden. Today, Swedish Flag Day, naval chief Bengt Schuback came to Aseda in Smaland to receive 1.2 million kronor.

The Swedish flags were waving when naval chief Bengt Schuback and his wife entered the sports stadium in Aseda to receive the check. City commissioner Bo Jansson, culture secretary and submarine captain Anders Ekberg of the Submarine Committee, and musicians and patriotic feelings were all there, of course.

Actually, all that was lacking was the water. When it comes to naval attacks, Aseda is one of the safest places on earth. The Radeboda River could be navigated by square-riggers, at most, and they would be easily detected.

The naval chief had to receive the government's permission to accept the gift. It gratefully accepted the money. The money will be used for training in antisubmarine measures.

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ECONOMIC

DENMARK/GREENLAND

**CANADIAN, SWEDISH FIRMS IN AGREEMENT TO SAVE ZINC MINE**

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Jun 86 Sec III p 1

[Article by Jesper Elle: "Greenex Mine Saved"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] The continued operation of the Black Angel zinc mine in Greenland appears to have been ensured after Greenex reached an agreement in principle with Boliden over the weekend concerning a takeover of the mine.

Greenland's biggest job site, the Black Angel zinc mine in Maarmorilik, has been saved until at least 1987 after the Canadian owner of the Greenex mine company, the Cominco concern, and the Swedish Boliden mining concern reached an agreement in principle on a takeover over the weekend.

Negotiations have concerned such things as the price of Greenex stock and the two sides reached a basic agreement on a price level that has not been disclosed at this time. It was reported earlier that Boliden offered around 20 million kroner for the stock while Cominco was asking close to 50 million.

"There are still some technical and legal questions that will have to be discussed further on Monday. Everyone anticipates a quick resolution, after which the agreement will be presented in its entirety," the chairman of the Greenex board of directors, barrister Esben Dragsted, told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

When the remaining questions have been cleared up, the agreement must be approved by the boards of the two companies and by political authorities in Greenland and Denmark.

If the takeover of the mine goes through, operations will continue as before with Boliden as the new stockholder, according to Greenex administrative director Erik Sprunk-Jansen.

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ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

#### FOREIGN LOANS SUCCESSFULLY RENEGOTIATED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 17 May 86 p 18

[Excerpts] Portugal renegotiated three foreign loans totaling \$500 million this week. It took advantage of the current situation of lower interest rates in the international money markets.

These loans were taken in March 1985. Two of them are in dollars (respectively \$165 million and \$250 million) and the third is denominated in ECU's (127 million ECU's). The lead banks were Bank of Tokyo and Citibank. Almost all the banks that originally participated in the consortium renegotiated the agreement. Barclays and Deutsch Bank left the consortium.

Portugal will obtain better interest rates as a result of the renegotiations. Interest rates have decreased by almost two points during the last months. The first loan was a traditional type loan with an interest rate five eights over LIBOR.

The second loan consisted of short term renewable promissary notes. The renegotiated loan substituted the syndicated part of the original one with promissary notes of equal value. This will allow savings to be made on interest rates, which are lower for promissary notes, and the various fees charged by the consortium banks.

Forty million dollars was set aside to cover exchange rate risks. The agreement will go into effect in June. The loan is for 7 years.

#### The Third Operation

This is the third successful renegotiation of Portuguese foreign debt by the Bank of Portugal. Foreign loans amounting to 225 contos have been renegotiated.

#### ADP: An Additional 100 Million

The EDP signed a \$100 million (about 16 million contos) loan agreement this week. The loan is to be repaid in 15 years. It is the most deferred of any loan taken out by Portuguese firms in the international money markets. It has a 7 year grace period and the interest rate is 0.45 percent. Japanese investors formed the syndicate for this loan. Citibank was the lead bank.

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ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

'ABSOLUTE POVERTY' SHOWN TO BE HIGH

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 May 86 p 15

[Text] Approximately half of all Portuguese families lived in poverty in 1981, according to a recently published report by CARITAS of Portugal. The study, entitled "Poverty in Portugal," was written by Engineers Manuela Silva and Brito da Costa. The study is being made public on the eve of a European seminar on poverty in Portugal that begins today at the Gulbenkian Foundation and ends Saturday.

The study pays particular attention to the period between 1973 and 1981 (in 1981 the population of Portugal was 9.3 million people). It defines poverty as falling into two different categories: relative poverty and absolute poverty. Relative poverty was determined by looking at the average per capita income of families and society while absolute poverty was determined on the basis of the cost of an adequate daily diet and comparing it with non-food expenditures.

Shortly prior to 25 April, 34.3 percent of Portuguese families, i.e., 3.3 million people, lived below the minimum subsistence level. They lived in absolute poverty. Seven years later, the level of absolute poverty reached 40 percent of all Portuguese people and 35.5 percent of all families were considered poor.

Nutrition Worse Than in 1981

The book's authors conducted a study in February 1985 among those people included in the "relative poverty" category. They discovered that 39 percent of the families polled felt their nutrition was now worse than in 1981. Only 15 percent felt their diet had improved during the previous 5 years.

The study shows a disturbing point. Those families in the absolute poverty category are those that have a head of household who is older and the group's level of education is lower. However, in over half the households that have an illiterate head of household there is poverty. The same is true in 44.7 percent of the cases where the head of household can only read and write but has not completed any level of education.

## Higher Percentage in Agriculture

According to this study, poverty is also related to the profession practiced by the head of household. This is proven by the fact that almost half the poor families, about 48 percent, have a head of household who is a farm laborer working for someone else or even works for himself. Forty-two percent of the unemployed fall into this category. Where the head of household is a professional, either technical or administrative, with the state or with private businesses, only 5.9 percent of the households are considered poor.

In addition, Portuguese poor families live under very precarious circumstances. Sixty-seven percent of those living in urban areas do not have bathrooms while 75 percent of those living in rural areas do not have these facilities. About 40 percent of urban households do not have sewers while 48 percent of rural homes do not have them. In addition, 19 percent of all Portuguese families do not have electricity. In rural this figure increases to 22 percent.

Fifty-eight percent of rural houses have no running water compared with 49 percent of urban ones.

Half the Portuguese population consumed one quarter of all goods and services in 1981. Close to 28.7 percent of all continental Portuguese rural families consumed only 12.8 percent of the nation's goods and services.

The authors divided Portuguese families into poor and not poor categories, and came to the conclusion that "to eliminate poverty" the less poor would have to give the poor 11 percent of their purchasing power.

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ENERGY

DENMARK/GREENLAND

# OIL RESERVES FOUND TO BE LESS THAN EXPECTED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Jun 86 Sec III p 2

[Article by Jesper Elle; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] Contrary to expectations, a very big part of the continental shelf off southeast Greenland is largely devoid of oil and gas possibilities, according to a report from Greenland Geological Surveys. The report, which is the result of a 6-year research project, also shows that the northernmost part of the shelf is the most interesting but also the least accessible area.


The area of potential oil and gas deposits on the Greenland shelf must now be reduced substantially after it was found that the southern part of the East Greenland shelf is virtually devoid of oil and gas possibilities.

From a geological point of view the southern and middle parts of the shelf off the coast of East Greenland are completely different from the nearby land areas which have big similarities with the geological conditions in the North Sea and on the Norwegian continental shelf, which is why there were expectations that hydrocarbon deposits might be found in the area.

A report from Greenland Geological Surveys, GGU, which presents the results of a 6-year research project, points out that of the original area surveyed, containing around 250,000 square kilometers, only around 40,000 square kilometers can be regarded as areas where oil and gas deposits might be found.

Seen in a broader Greenland context, this corresponds to a substantial reduction of around 40 percent in the Greenland shelf areas with some potential for oil production using existing oil technology.

The possibilities seem good in the central part of the East Greenland shelf, while the northern area is both the largest and the most promising area we know of in Greenland today. But at the same time this northern area is very hard to gain access to because of ice conditions there.



Greenland's potential oil areas are much smaller than originally anticipated.

Key:

1. Greenland
2. Iceland



## Costs High

Although the possibility of finding oil in the middle part of the shelf is described as moderate to good in a belt around 60-80 km wide, actual exploration will be expensive.

The report says that a serious exploration program should include more detailed seismic measurements of the entire region at a cost of around 100-150 million kroner. Deep explorations in the area are currently on the borderline of what is technologically possible and the cost is estimated at a minimum of 500 million kroner per hole drilled.

For purposes of comparison, the cost of exploratory drilling in the North Sea runs between 50 and 100 million kroner.

There have been no seismic studies of the northeastern part of the shelf because the almost permanent layer of heavy pack ice makes this extremely difficult.

The area is free of ice for only a few weeks in years when there is less ice than usual. This occurs only once every 10 years. The last few times were in 1979 and 1985.

In spite of the lack of seismic measurements the region is described as promising. The expectations are associated with the fact that the interesting strata are of the same age and composition as the producing strata in the northern part of the North Sea and on the Norwegian continental shelf. The geological structure is considered to be very favorable and this means that not only is the area the most attractive one in Greenland from the point of view of quantity, it is also considered to be the most attractive in terms of quality, at least until we find out more about it. But as we mentioned above it is very hard to reach the area and it is one of the most technologically inaccessible areas in Greenland. Probably only the North Greenland shelf surpasses it in this regard and commercial production of hydrocarbon deposits in this region will probably not be technically feasible before the beginning of the next century.

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